The PKK may be dissolving, but its political legacy will shape Turkey, Syria, Iraq and the future of Kurdish politics across the Middle East.

By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) spent nearly half a century transforming itself from a small Marxist-Leninist Kurdish insurgency in Turkey into one of the most consequential non-state political and military movements in the modern Middle East. Now, after decades of war, territorial expansion, ideological transformation, and political adaptation, it faces a paradox that may prove more difficult than fighting itself: how does a movement survive after deciding to dissolve?

Turkey's parliament passed a landmark legal framework on August 10 establishing mechanisms for the PKK's disarmament, dissolution and the conditional reintegration of eligible former militants. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan subsequently signed the legislation, which entered into force after publication in Turkey's Official Gazette. The law provides for the suspension of certain investigations, prosecutions and sentences once Turkish authorities verify that the PKK and affiliated structures have ended their armed activities and surrendered their weapons.

That is a historic development. But it is not the same thing as resolving the Kurdish question.

The distinction matters because the PKK has never been merely a military organization. It became a political ecosystem, an ideological project, a transnational network and, eventually, a mechanism through which Kurdish political actors in Turkey and Syria organized themselves. Aliza Marcus's new book, Resurgence and Revolution: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight in Turkey and Syria, is therefore arriving at precisely the moment when the organization's future is being decided. Published by NYU Press in May 2026, the book traces the PKK's transformation after Abdullah Öcalan's capture in 1999 and examines how the movement extended its influence into Syria while becoming an unlikely American partner against ISIS.

Marcus's central contribution is to demonstrate why dissolving the PKK does not necessarily mean dissolving the political and social forces that the organization created.

From Insurgency to Regional Movement

The PKK was founded in 1978 and began its armed struggle against the Turkish state in 1984. The conflict eventually killed more than 40,000 people and became one of the defining security problems of modern Turkey. Yet the organization's most important transformation occurred after Öcalan was captured in 1999.

Marcus's earlier book, Blood and Belief, chronicled the PKK's rise through Öcalan's arrest. Resurgence and Revolution picks up the story from that moment and follows the movement through ceasefires, renewed war, the collapse of the 2013–2015 peace process, the disastrous urban warfare of 2015–16 and, eventually, the emergence of the PKK-linked political and military architecture in northeastern Syria.

This history reveals an important paradox. Öcalan's imprisonment weakened the PKK's traditional command structure, but it did not destroy his authority. Instead, his prison writings and political interventions enabled the organization to redefine itself.

The PKK gradually moved away from its original demand for an independent Kurdish state and toward a political philosophy emphasizing democratic self-government, local autonomy, gender equality and what Öcalan called democratic confederalism. That ideological transformation gave the organization a second life. It also created the conditions for the PKK's most consequential geopolitical expansion: Syria.

Rojava Changed the Equation

The Syrian civil war created an opportunity that the PKK could not have manufactured on its own. As the Assad regime lost control of northeastern Syria, Kurdish political and military organizations consolidated power across large areas. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) subsequently became Washington's principal local partner against ISIS, creating one of the strangest strategic relationships of the post-9/11 Middle East.

The United States was simultaneously cooperating with a Kurdish-led military structure whose dominant political current was closely connected to the PKK while Turkey, a NATO ally, regarded that relationship as a direct national-security threat.

Marcus's account is particularly valuable here because it explores not simply the battlefield relationship between Washington and the SDF but the organizational and ideological connections between the Syrian Kurdish movement and the PKK. NYU Press describes the book as drawing on interviews with PKK fighters, supporters and opponents across Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Europe to explain how the organization maintained influence across borders.

The result was a strategic contradiction that Washington never fully resolved. The United States needed the SDF to defeat ISIS. Turkey wanted the PKK-linked structures dismantled. Kurdish actors wanted to preserve their political gains. Damascus wanted to restore state sovereignty. And the PKK itself increasingly viewed the Syrian arena as part of a broader Kurdish political project.

The American experience in northeastern Syria therefore offers a broader lesson: military partnerships can create political realities that outlive the original purpose for which the partnership was established. The defeat of ISIS did not make those realities disappear.

The Most Important Question Is No Longer Whether the PKK Will Dissolve

The PKK has already announced its intention to dissolve. It has undertaken symbolic disarmament and reported withdrawals from numerous positions along the Turkey-Iraq border. Kurdish Policy Analysis reported earlier this month that the organization had withdrawn from 81 positions, following previous withdrawals, as the peace process moved from political declarations toward changes on the ground.

The Turkish parliament's August 10 legislation represents the institutional counterpart to those developments. But the more important question is what comes next. A military organization can disappear relatively quickly. A political movement cannot.

The PKK's organizational structures have operated for decades across Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Europe. Its ideology has influenced generations of Kurdish activists. Its political vocabulary has entered Kurdish discourse far beyond the organization itself. Its networks have interacted with parties, civil society organizations and armed groups across several states. That means dissolution could produce transformation rather than disappearance.

The PKK may cease to exist as a conventional insurgent organization while its political influence survives through new parties, movements, civil society structures and individual cadres.

This is precisely why Marcus's historical argument is so relevant to the current moment. The organization repeatedly survived by changing form. There is little reason to assume that its final transformation will be different.

Turkey's Real Test Begins After Disarmament

Ankara has achieved something previous Turkish governments could not: the PKK has accepted the principle that armed struggle should end. But the Turkish state now faces its own test.

The current legislation is substantial, but it does not by itself resolve many of the issues that have defined the Kurdish question for decades. Reuters noted that the law does not settle broader questions involving Kurdish political and cultural rights, anti-terror legislation or Öcalan's status.

This creates a dangerous asymmetry. The PKK is being asked to surrender its most powerful instrument—armed force—while the Kurdish political movement is still asking what institutional guarantees will replace it.

That was one of the central weaknesses of previous peace efforts. The 2013–2015 process demonstrated that negotiations can move surprisingly far when both sides believe there is a political opening. It also demonstrated how quickly trust can collapse when the underlying political architecture remains unresolved.

The lesson from that failure is straightforward: disarmament cannot be treated as the endpoint of peace. It must be part of a reciprocal process in which political inclusion, legal reform and democratic participation develop alongside the dismantling of armed structures. Otherwise, Ankara risks creating a vacuum in which the PKK disappears organizationally but the grievances and political demands associated with it remain unresolved.

Öcalan's Paradoxical Return to Politics

Perhaps the most extraordinary feature of the current process is the renewed importance of Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan has been imprisoned since 1999. Yet his influence has survived more than a quarter-century of incarceration. Indeed, the peace process may have made his political relevance greater rather than smaller.

If the Turkish state needs the PKK to dissolve, it needs someone capable of persuading its members and supporters that dissolution is legitimate. Öcalan is uniquely positioned to perform that role. This creates a profound paradox: the process designed to end the PKK could simultaneously strengthen the political importance of the man who founded it.

Kurdish Policy Analysis examined this dynamic in July, arguing that Turkey's emerging framework law could elevate Öcalan's influence by making his political endorsement increasingly important to the success of disarmament.

The Turkish government therefore faces a difficult strategic calculation. How much political space should it give Öcalan? How should his future status be addressed? Can Ankara use his authority to end the armed conflict without allowing him to become an indispensable political actor? And can Turkey resolve the Kurdish issue without eventually confronting the question of Öcalan himself? These questions are unlikely to disappear simply because the PKK does.

Syria May Be the Harder Problem

The future of the PKK cannot be separated from Syria. For more than a decade, northeastern Syria became the most successful example of the PKK's ideological and organizational influence outside Turkey. The Kurdish-led administration built institutions, military structures and political mechanisms that survived a devastating civil war and the rise of ISIS.

But the post-Assad Middle East has fundamentally altered the strategic environment. The Kurdish political project in Syria now faces the challenge of negotiating its place within a reconfigured Syrian state. The question is no longer simply whether Kurdish forces can control territory; it is whether Kurdish political gains can be converted into durable constitutional and institutional arrangements.

That distinction is critical. Territorial control can be lost. Institutions are harder to erase. But institutions require political legitimacy, and that legitimacy ultimately depends on whether Damascus, Ankara, Washington and the Syrian Kurdish leadership can agree on the future shape of the Syrian state. This is where the Turkish-PKK peace process acquires regional significance.

Marcus argues that Öcalan's thinking connected developments in Turkey and Syria. The logic was straightforward: reducing the conflict with Ankara could protect Kurdish gains elsewhere. NYU Press similarly emphasizes that the fall of Assad and the new Turkish peace process have fundamentally changed the environment surrounding Kurdish demands and territorial control in Syria.

But that strategy has already encountered limits. Ending the PKK conflict in Turkey cannot automatically guarantee Kurdish autonomy in Syria. Nor can Syrian Kurdish actors assume that their wartime partnership with Washington will automatically translate into American support for permanent political autonomy. The regional system is moving toward states rather than revolutionary movements. That may be the most consequential strategic shift facing the Kurdish movement.

The Kurdistan Region Is the Missing Piece

Iraq's Kurdistan Region will also become increasingly important. For decades, the PKK's presence in northern Iraq has created a triangular problem involving Ankara, Baghdad and Erbil. Turkish military operations against PKK positions have repeatedly affected communities across the Kurdistan Region, while the KRG has struggled to balance its relations with Turkey against its desire to prevent northern Iraq from becoming a permanent battlefield.

If the PKK genuinely dismantles its military infrastructure, the strategic benefits could be substantial. Reduced Turkish military operations would improve border security. Local economies could recover. Cross-border trade could expand. And the Kurdistan Region could gain greater political space to develop its relationship with Ankara and Baghdad without the PKK question dominating the agenda.

Kurdish Policy Analysis has previously argued that successful PKK dissolution could generate a broader peace dividend for the Kurdistan Region, including improved security, investment and regional economic connectivity.

But there is another possibility. If the PKK dissolves without a clear political settlement, former cadres could become dispersed across the region. Some may enter political life. Others may relocate. Some could resist the process. The difference between peaceful transformation and fragmentation will depend on how carefully the transition is managed.

The PKK's Greatest Strength Was Also Its Greatest Weakness

Marcus's account offers another important lesson: the PKK's endurance was not only a product of military organization. It was also the result of a powerful internal culture. The organization exercised extraordinary influence over the lives of its members, including their personal and emotional relationships. Its ideological discipline helped maintain cohesion, but it also produced internal struggles and purges when members challenged leadership decisions or organizational norms.

This matters today because political organizations do not disappear simply because their military wings do. The people who spent decades inside the organization must find new identities. Some may become politicians. Some may become civil society activists. Some may return to ordinary civilian life.

Others may find the transition psychologically and politically difficult. The success of the peace process will therefore depend partly on whether former fighters are offered a credible future beyond the organization. This is why the Turkish legislation's reintegration mechanisms matter. The law provides conditional protections for eligible former members once the disarmament process is verified, while excluding senior figures including Öcalan from those provisions. The architecture of reintegration may ultimately prove just as important as the architecture of disarmament.

What Happens If the Peace Process Fails?

The most dangerous assumption would be that failure simply means a return to the past. It would not. The Middle East of 2026 is fundamentally different from the Middle East of 2015. Syria has undergone regime change. Iran's regional position has been transformed by war. Kurdish actors have accumulated military and political experience across multiple theaters. Turkey has expanded its military footprint in northern Iraq and Syria. The United States is recalibrating its regional commitments.

A renewed Turkey-PKK conflict would therefore unfold within a much wider geopolitical system. That makes the stakes higher. Kurdish Policy Analysis has previously argued that regional conflict, particularly the Iran war, has demonstrated how quickly Kurdish issues can become embedded in wider Middle Eastern security competition.

The same logic applies to the peace process. A failure in Turkey would not necessarily remain inside Turkey. It could affect Iraq, Syria and Iran simultaneously. That is why the current process deserves to be understood not merely as a Turkish domestic initiative but as a regional restructuring project.

The PKK May Disappear. The Kurdish Question Will Not.

The central lesson of Resurgence and Revolution is that the PKK's history cannot be separated from the broader Kurdish political question. The organization has been one of the most powerful actors in that history, but it is not synonymous with Kurdish identity or Kurdish politics.

That distinction will become increasingly important after dissolution. If the PKK disappears as an armed organization, Kurdish politics will not disappear with it. On the contrary, political competition among Kurdish parties and movements may intensify as armed struggle loses its central role.

This could be healthy. It could also be destabilizing. The Kurdish political space has never been unified. It contains competing ideologies, parties, generations and strategic visions. Turkey's Kurds, Iraqi Kurds and Syrian Kurds face different political environments, despite sharing a broader national identity.

The end of the PKK's armed struggle therefore creates an opening for something potentially much larger: the normalization of Kurdish politics.

That would mean replacing the logic of mountains, weapons and insurgency with elections, institutions, negotiation and constitutional politics. It is a difficult transition. But it may also be the only sustainable one.

A New Kurdish Political Era?

The PKK fought for decades because its leaders believed that armed struggle was the only available path toward political transformation. The current process rests on the opposite proposition: that Kurdish political objectives can survive without an armed organization. Whether that proposition succeeds will depend on Ankara as much as on the PKK.

Turkey must demonstrate that disarmament produces political opportunity rather than simply the disappearance of an adversary. The Kurdish movement must demonstrate that political participation can replace armed organization. Syria must find a workable formula for Kurdish participation in the post-Assad state. Iraq and the Kurdistan Region must ensure that the transition does not create a new security vacuum. And Washington must recognize that its relationship with Kurdish actors cannot be reduced to battlefield utility.

The real question, therefore, is not whether the PKK will survive. The PKK as an armed organization may indeed be approaching the end of its historical life. The more consequential question is whether its political legacy can evolve into something that no longer requires an insurgency to exist. That is the great historical test now facing the Kurdish movement.

If the transition succeeds, the dissolution of the PKK could mark not the end of Kurdish politics, but the beginning of its normalization across the Middle East. If it fails, history offers an ominous warning.

As Marcus's account demonstrates, movements that believe political change has stalled can return to conflict with remarkable speed. The opportunity before Turkey and the Kurds is therefore larger than simply ending a war. It is to prove that a movement born in the mountains can finally become part of the political order it spent decades fighting to transform. And that may be the only way the PKK truly disappears—by making the political questions that created it possible to resolve without it.

Further Reading

For a deeper examination of the current transition, see Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj's “The PKK After Dissolution: Peace Dividend or Strategic Transformation?”, which examines how the end of the PKK could reshape Turkey, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a Kurdish policy analyst and founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, focusing on Kurdish politics, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, regional security, energy geopolitics and the changing strategic architecture of the Middle East. He holds a PhD in English Literature from Brunel University London and writes on the intersection of Kurdish affairs, international politics and regional security.

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