When War Builds the State: Iraq, Ukraine, Israel and the Strategic Paradox of Prolonged Conflict

When War Builds the State: Iraq, Ukraine, Israel and the Strategic Paradox of Prolonged Conflict

Introduction: The paradox of military attrition

A conventional understanding of warfare suggests that prolonged conflict gradually weakens the state, particularly when it is militarily inferior to its adversary. The longer a weaker country remains exposed to sustained military pressure, the greater the destruction of its infrastructure, the depletion of its economic resources, the loss of human life and the erosion of its institutional capacity. Eventually, the cumulative costs of war are expected to undermine its ability to sustain resistance.

This understanding, however, captures only one dimension of the relationship between warfare and state power. History demonstrates that prolonged conflict can produce a seemingly contradictory outcome: a state may become economically exhausted, socially damaged and territorially diminished while simultaneously becoming militarily stronger, more centralised, technologically adaptive and politically consolidated.

War does not simply destroy state capacity. It can also reorganise it. Under certain circumstances, the mobilisation of national resources, the expansion of military institutions, the development of domestic defence industries and the transformation of national identity can generate capabilities that did not exist before the conflict. The result is a strategic paradox: the state may become weaker in its overall economic and social foundations while becoming considerably more capable of conducting warfare.

Three historical experiences illustrate this dynamic: Iraq during its eight-year war with Iran, Ukraine during its confrontation with Russia, and Israel through successive regional wars. Although their political systems, military capabilities and strategic circumstances differ considerably, they demonstrate how sustained conflict can accelerate military institutionalisation and transform the relationship between the state, society and national security.

Iraq and Iran: How an eight-year war transformed military power

The Iran–Iraq War provides an important historical example of military expansion under conditions of prolonged conflict. When Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, its armed forces were considerably smaller than the military establishment they would eventually become. Iraq began the war with approximately 200,000 ground troops organised into thirteen divisions and three brigades. By the final years of the conflict, its military manpower had expanded dramatically.

By 1987–1988, Iraq's military manpower had reached approximately one million, while its army had expanded into dozens of divisions and a much larger organisational structure. Some military histories estimate that Iraq had 56 divisions and approximately 1.1 million personnel by late 1989, placing it among the world's largest military powers at the time. This transformation was not simply a matter of recruiting additional soldiers. It involved the expansion of military production, intelligence capabilities, logistics, command structures, armoured formations and the state's capacity to mobilise national resources.

The war therefore produced a substantial transformation in Iraq's military institutions. The country entered the conflict with a relatively limited military establishment and emerged with an enormous conventional military apparatus. This expansion, however, came at a devastating economic and human cost. Iraq accumulated substantial foreign debt, exhausted financial resources and became increasingly dependent on external financial and military support.

The political dimension is equally important. The Iraqi state demonstrated an extensive capacity to mobilise society, sustain a large military establishment and maintain its political control during an exceptionally destructive conflict. Yet this mobilisation should not be confused with voluntary national unity. The Baathist regime relied heavily on coercion, repression and authoritarian control, and the experiences of Shiite communities and Kurds were fundamentally different from the regime's official narrative of national mobilisation.

Nevertheless, the war demonstrated that a prolonged external threat could substantially expand the organisational and military capabilities of the Iraqi state. Its eventual invasion of Kuwait in 1990, however, fundamentally altered this trajectory. The military establishment built during the war could not compensate for the strategic consequences of the invasion, the international coalition against Iraq and the subsequent destruction of much of its military and economic capacity.

The Iraqi experience therefore illustrates both sides of the paradox: war can build military power, but military expansion does not necessarily produce sustainable national strength or sound strategic decision-making.

Ukraine: Warfare as an engine of military and technological transformation

Ukraine offers a more contemporary illustration of this phenomenon. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine faced an adversary with significantly greater economic resources, a larger population and a much more extensive conventional military establishment.

Ukraine's initial military position was challenging. Its armed forces inherited much of their organisational structure and equipment from the Soviet military tradition. Its defence industry was also considerably less developed than Russia's in terms of the resources available for a prolonged conventional war.

However, the conflict has fundamentally transformed Ukraine's military capabilities and defence-industrial structure.

One of the most striking developments has been the expansion of its domestic drone industry. According to the Centre for Eastern Studies, Ukraine produced approximately 2.2 million unmanned aerial vehicles in 2024, with production expected to exceed 4.5 million in 2025. The number of companies entering its aerospace and drone sector also expanded rapidly. By the end of 2025, estimates indicated that approximately 500 domestic drone manufacturers were operating in the country.

This transformation is particularly significant because it demonstrates how military necessity can accelerate technological innovation. Civilian engineering, private manufacturing, software development and decentralised production have increasingly become integrated into Ukraine's defence ecosystem. The traditional boundaries between civilian industry and military production have consequently become less distinct.

Ukraine's military transformation also extends beyond drone production. Its armed forces have adapted their operational doctrines, integrated new technologies, expanded battlefield intelligence and developed more decentralised approaches to military decision-making. Its experience has become an important source of lessons for other countries examining the future of warfare.

The transformation has also had a national dimension. Russia's invasion has strengthened Ukrainian national identification and accelerated the political and cultural separation between Ukraine and Russia. Language, historical memory and national sovereignty have become increasingly central to the country's wartime identity.

Nevertheless, Ukraine's transformation should not be interpreted as evidence that prolonged war necessarily strengthens the weaker side. Its military survival has depended significantly on international assistance, while the country continues to experience enormous human losses, infrastructure destruction, demographic pressures and economic vulnerability. Its military innovation has developed alongside, rather than eliminated, these structural weaknesses.

The Ukrainian case nevertheless demonstrates that a materially weaker state can develop specialised military advantages through technological adaptation, social mobilisation and institutional learning.

Israel: Military doctrine, institutional continuity and external support

Israel provides a different dimension of the relationship between warfare and state power. Unlike Iraq and Ukraine, Israel has repeatedly fought adversaries with larger populations and, in several historical conflicts, greater territorial and demographic resources.

Its military development has been shaped by a security doctrine emphasising deterrence, intelligence, early warning, initiative and the prevention of emerging threats. Military readiness, technological innovation and the integration of intelligence into operational planning have remained central features of its national security system.

The wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and subsequent conflicts contributed to the evolution of Israeli military doctrine, operational experience and defence institutions. Repeated confrontations also encouraged the development of domestic military industries, advanced intelligence capabilities and technological cooperation with external partners.

A crucial factor, however, distinguishes Israel from Iraq and Ukraine: its longstanding strategic relationship with the United States. American military assistance, advanced weapons systems, intelligence cooperation and joint missile-defence programmes have substantially contributed to Israel's conventional military advantages. Its military development cannot therefore be explained exclusively through the experience of warfare or domestic mobilisation.

Israel also illustrates the limitations of military superiority. The ability to destroy infrastructure, eliminate military commanders and achieve tactical objectives does not automatically translate into a durable political settlement or the elimination of an adversary's capacity to resist. Military success and strategic success are not interchangeable.

The Israeli experience consequently reinforces a broader argument: sustained warfare can generate military adaptation and institutional development, but its long-term consequences depend on political leadership, institutional resilience, external partnerships and the ability to convert battlefield achievements into sustainable security arrangements.

Why prolonged warfare can strengthen military institutions

There are several mechanisms through which prolonged conflict can expand a state's military capabilities even as its broader national resources deteriorate.

First, war changes the allocation of national resources. During peacetime, governments distribute financial resources across education, healthcare, infrastructure, public administration, economic development and security. Under wartime conditions, military expenditure and defence production become increasingly dominant priorities. The state redirects a much larger proportion of its remaining resources towards military requirements. This does not mean that the country possesses greater resources than before the war. Rather, the resources that remain become more concentrated in the military sector.

Second, prolonged warfare accelerates institutional militarisation. Emergency governance, centralised decision-making, intelligence coordination, military logistics and security administration increasingly shape the functioning of the state. Civilian industries, research institutions, transportation networks and technological companies may be redirected towards defence requirements. In effect, the state develops a wartime organisational structure in which previously civilian capabilities become part of the national military effort.

Third, military necessity accelerates technological innovation. Countries facing existential military threats cannot always depend on conventional procurement systems or foreign suppliers. They are compelled to develop domestic solutions, adapt existing technologies and establish new production networks. Ukraine's drone industry demonstrates how a prolonged conflict can create an extensive defence ecosystem within a relatively short period.

Fourth, war can strengthen national identity and collective mobilisation. When a society perceives an external threat to its territorial integrity or national existence, national identification may become more pronounced. Language, historical memory, national symbols and collective security can acquire greater political significance. This process can strengthen the state's legitimacy and increase society's willingness to support national defence. However, it is not automatic: prolonged casualties, economic hardship, repression and political divisions can also weaken public confidence in the government.

Finally, warfare produces institutional learning. Armies exposed to prolonged combat acquire operational experience, identify weaknesses and adapt their doctrines. Intelligence agencies develop new methods, military commanders refine their decision-making and defence industries respond to battlefield requirements. An army that survives repeated confrontations may become more experienced and adaptable, even if it has lost substantial personnel and equipment.

These mechanisms explain why the military balance between two adversaries cannot be measured exclusively through economic size, population, territory or the destruction inflicted during a particular campaign.

Iran: Could prolonged warfare produce a stronger military state?

The Iranian case raises perhaps the most consequential geopolitical question in this discussion. The military confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the United States has demonstrated the extent to which military pressure can affect Iran's infrastructure, economy, regional influence and strategic capabilities. Yet the consequences of a prolonged conflict cannot be assessed exclusively through the damage inflicted on Iranian targets.

Iran possesses a distinctive institutional and military structure. Its security architecture includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the regular armed forces, the Basij mobilisation network, intelligence organisations and a domestic defence-industrial sector. These institutions have developed over several decades under conditions of sanctions, regional confrontation and persistent security competition.

This structure gives Iran several mechanisms through which it could sustain military mobilisation. Its experience in asymmetric warfare, missile development, drone production and the use of geographically dispersed military capabilities could contribute to its capacity to adapt to sustained pressure.

The comparison with Iraq during the 1980s is particularly relevant. Iran entered the Iran–Iraq War with a revolutionary military establishment that was still undergoing institutional consolidation. During the conflict, the IRGC and Basij expanded significantly, becoming central components of the country's military and political structure. The war helped institutionalise a security architecture that would continue to shape the Iranian state for decades.

A contemporary conflict could generate another period of institutional transformation. Iran might redirect a greater proportion of its remaining economic and technological resources towards military production, expand its mobilisation structures and strengthen the role of security institutions in national decision-making. Its defence industry could also become more focused on inexpensive, asymmetric and technologically adaptable capabilities.

However, it is essential to distinguish between potential mobilisation and demonstrated military capacity. Claims that Iran could mobilise two or three million fighters should not be treated as evidence that it possesses an equally large, trained, equipped and operationally sustainable fighting force. Manpower alone does not determine military effectiveness. Training, logistics, command structures, equipment, economic resources and the ability to sustain operations are equally important.

There is also no guarantee that an external war would strengthen the Iranian government's domestic legitimacy. An external threat can encourage national solidarity, but the Iranian population is politically diverse, and opposition to government policies cannot simply be equated with opposition to Iran's national sovereignty. Economic deterioration, civilian casualties, institutional repression and the destruction of infrastructure could deepen existing political and social tensions.

The central possibility is therefore not necessarily that Iran emerges as a stronger state in every respect. It is that Iran could become a more militarised state, with a greater proportion of its surviving institutional and technological capacity devoted to national defence and asymmetric warfare.

This distinction is fundamental to understanding the strategic consequences of a prolonged conflict.

The regional consequences: Why neighbouring powers are concerned

The possibility of a prolonged Iran conflict has implications that extend far beyond the immediate confrontation between Tehran, Washington and Tel Aviv.

Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt and the Gulf states have substantial reasons to be concerned about the emergence of a more militarised regional environment. Even if Iran suffers considerable economic and military damage, a prolonged confrontation could produce new security challenges, including further militarisation, greater reliance on asymmetric capabilities, disruption of maritime trade and increased competition over regional influence.

For Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the security of the Strait of Hormuz and the wider Persian Gulf remains particularly important. A prolonged confrontation could increase the costs of protecting energy infrastructure, commercial shipping and critical economic facilities. It could also complicate regional economic diversification strategies that depend on stability, foreign investment and international connectivity.

Türkiye faces a different but equally important set of considerations. It must manage its security interests along its southern borders, maintain economic and diplomatic relations across the region and avoid an escalation that could affect its strategic autonomy. Egypt, meanwhile, has interests in regional stability, maritime security and the protection of trade routes, particularly given the strategic importance of the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

The convergence of these concerns helps explain the importance of regional diplomatic engagement. Neighbouring countries may disagree over Iran's regional policies and military capabilities, but they also have an interest in preventing a prolonged conflict from transforming the Middle East into a permanently militarised security environment.

For these countries, the principal concern is not simply whether Iran becomes weaker or stronger. It is whether the conflict creates a regional order in which military confrontation becomes the dominant instrument of political competition.

The strategic paradox: Destroying capabilities versus transforming the adversary

This brings the discussion back to the central question: can military pressure produce the opposite of its intended strategic outcome?

The answer depends on the distinction between destroying existing capabilities and preventing the emergence of new ones.

A military campaign may destroy factories, military bases, command centres, weapons systems and infrastructure. It may also eliminate experienced commanders and disrupt the adversary's capacity to coordinate operations. These are tangible military outcomes.

However, the destruction of existing capabilities does not automatically prevent institutional adaptation. A state under sustained pressure may decentralise production, develop alternative supply chains, reorganise command structures and invest in less expensive forms of military technology. It may also expand its reliance on irregular forces and asymmetric methods of warfare.

The strategic challenge is that an adversary can lose conventional military assets while becoming more experienced in asymmetric conflict. It can suffer economic contraction while increasing the relative priority of defence production. It can lose regional influence while developing a stronger domestic security apparatus.

This is particularly relevant to Iran, whose military strategy has never depended exclusively on conventional parity with the United States or Israel.

At the same time, the opposite outcome remains possible. Prolonged warfare can overwhelm a state whose economic foundations are too weak, whose institutions are fragmented or whose population refuses to sustain the costs of mobilisation. Iraq's experience after 1990 demonstrates that military expansion during one conflict cannot guarantee resilience against subsequent strategic shocks.

The duration of war is therefore not, by itself, the decisive variable. The more important questions concern the state's institutional adaptability, economic endurance, social cohesion, external support and ability to translate military experience into sustainable capabilities.

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