Kurdish Policy Analysis

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Although the government crisis in Southern Kurdistan is often seen as a disagreement between the KDP and PUK, it is evolving into a situation that targets some of the Kurdish people’s most significant achievements and weakens the Kurdish position.

More than a year and a half has passed since the elections held in Southern Kurdistan (Northern Iraq) on October 20, 2024, yet a coalition government has still not been formed. This situation, caused by disagreements between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), has also directly affected the formation of the Iraqi government, including the months-long presidential election crisis that followed the parliamentary elections held in Iraq in November 2025.

Dozens of meetings yielded no results

Parliamentary elections were held in Southern Kurdistan on October 20, 2024, when the KDP won 40 seats, the PUK 23, the New Generation Movement 16, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtû) 7, Halwest 3, the People’s Front (Berey Gel) 2, and Gorran and Komal 3 seats.

Following the elections, dozens of meetings held between the KDP and the PUK, during which issues such as the redistribution of ministries and the selection of the president were negotiated, failed to produce results.

As of today, since a new cabinet has not been formed, the pre-election government continues to operate de facto under the title of a caretaker government.

The impact of the crisis on the Iraqi presidential election

The dispute between the KDP and the PUK also contributed to political uncertainty in Iraq following the general elections held on November 11, 2025, as the president could not be elected and a new government could not be formed. The failure to elect a president meant that no prime minister could be tasked with forming a government, resulting in a prolonged delay in government formation.

Under the political customs and conventions that emerged following Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, the President of Iraq is chosen from among the Kurds. According to another political tradition and agreement among Kurdish parties, the PUK nominates the candidate for the Iraqi presidency, while a KDP figure assumes the position of Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region. The main purpose of these agreements and understandings was to preserve unity among Kurdish parties and avoid divisions in dealings with the Iraqi government.

The current crisis began when the KDP openly challenged this tradition and consensus by demanding the right to nominate its own candidate for the Iraqi presidency. Moreover, this is not the first time such a situation has occurred. Following the previous elections, the KDP nominated former Foreign Minister and Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari for the presidency in 2022, but Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court disqualified his candidacy. Adopting a stance similar to its current position, the KDP at that time also delayed the formation of the Iraqi government for months through boycotts and other measures, weakening Kurdish representation in the process.

KDP’s refusal to recognize the elected president and withdrawal from the Iraqi parliament

Despite all objections and initiatives by the KDP, Nizar Amedi, the sole candidate nominated by the PUK, was elected President of Iraq in a vote held in the Iraqi Parliament on April 11, 2026, which the KDP boycotted.

On the same day, the KDP Political Bureau issued a statement announcing that it would not recognize Nizar Amedi as the representative of Kurdistan and declared that it was withdrawing all of its representatives from both the Council of Representatives and the Iraqi Federal Government. The statement read:

“Today, April 11, 2026, the presidential election process in the Iraqi Council of Representatives was conducted in violation of the parliament’s approved internal regulations. Furthermore, the candidate selected for the presidency was chosen outside Kurdish mechanisms. This office belongs not to a single party but to the people of Kurdistan. However, the candidate in question was selected by one party and approved by certain parties belonging to other Iraqi components. Therefore, we reject this method of election and do not recognize the individual selected in this manner as the representative of the Kurdish majority, nor will we engage with him. At present, our parliamentary bloc and our representatives in the Iraqi Federal Government are returning to the Kurdistan Region for consultations and assessment of the situation.”

In essence, through this statement, the KDP announced that in the short term it was withdrawing from the Iraqi Federal Government, and in the long term it would continue to oppose not only this presidential election but also any future election of a PUK-affiliated figure to the Iraqi presidency, disregarding long-standing agreements on the matter.

However, despite the KDP’s objections and decision to withdraw from parliament, Nizar Amedi, elected as President of Iraq, tasked Ali Zeydi with forming a government, and a new Iraqi government was subsequently established under his leadership.

On May 4, 2026, Kurdistan Region President and KDP official Nechirvan Barzani announced that the KDP would return to Baghdad after holding meetings there with Zeydi and representatives of Shiite parties. It was also reported that the parties reached an agreement regarding the representation of the KDP, PUK, and other Kurdish groups in the new government.

Why are the KDP and PUK unable to agree on forming a government?

As noted above, the KDP and PUK—the two largest parties in Southern Kurdistan—had reached a political understanding, though not a constitutional one, regarding the sharing of the Iraqi presidency, the presidency of the Kurdistan Region, and the prime ministry on a rotating two-year basis. However, this balance has gradually shifted over the years.

In response to the KDP’s policy of consolidating regional dominance, the PUK seeks stronger representation within the government and no longer wishes to be limited to symbolic positions. In particular, it aims to gain greater influence over the security bureaucracy, the Ministry of Interior, and executive institutions.

Seeking full partnership in the administration of the Kurdistan Region, the PUK argues that the KDP has become the dominant force in decision-making processes, disrupting the political balance.

As a result of disagreements over control of the Ministry of Interior and security institutions, the KDP seeks to maintain its dominant role in governance, while the PUK demands equal partnership.

A 2023 ruling by Iraq’s Federal Court, which prevented the KDP from securing a majority through the minority quota system and forming a government alone, reduced the number of parliamentary seats from 111 to 100 and lowered the number of quota seats from 11 to 5. Consequently, the KDP no longer has the possibility of forming a government without the PUK by relying on quota seats.

The political, social, and economic impact of the failure to form a government

Although there is officially a single government in the Kurdistan Region, a de facto dual-administration system has emerged. A clear division exists between the KDP administration centered in Erbil and the PUK administration centered in Sulaymaniyah. The issue is no longer simply a matter of which party controls which position. The inability to form a government has led to disputes over revenue distribution and unequal allocation of resources, the paralysis of parliamentary work, slowed investments, salary and appointment crises, rising unemployment, and severe disruptions in the functioning of public institutions.

If this situation continues for an extended period, central institutions may become even more dysfunctional, as the failure to reach political consensus has already reached a point where it significantly affects daily life. Every month without a government weakens not only political institutions but also economic life and social stability. The economic and social problems felt across the vast geography of Southern Kurdistan—from Sulaymaniyah to Duhok, and from Germiyan to Halabja—are direct consequences of this political deadlock.

Since the Kurdistan Region Parliament has effectively become unable to function, with no speaker’s bureau elected and legislative activities suspended, the prolonged government formation crisis has also undermined public trust in political institutions.

Hospital workers, contract teachers, and various public employees have gone months without receiving their salaries. Alongside this, electricity outages, fuel shortages, road and environmental problems—all of which directly affect the public—stem from the absence of an active and functioning government.

Despite possessing some of the world’s most significant oil reserves, the Kurdistan Region frequently experiences fuel crises. Long queues at gas stations, problems in fuel distribution, and price fluctuations have generated serious public frustration. In recent years, increased control by the central government over oil revenues—resulting from divisions among Kurdish parties and their inability to pursue a common policy—has also narrowed the Kurdistan Region’s economic autonomy.

As this government crisis deepens, weakening the local economy and placing the political status of the Kurdistan Region at risk, problems in oil exports and uncertainty over revenue-sharing continue to undermine public finances, nearly eliminating one of the government’s primary missions: providing services to the people.

The crisis affects not only the government but all of Kurdistan

The inability to develop a common Kurdish position strengthens the hand of the central government while simultaneously placing the status of the Kurdistan Region at risk. The political, economic, and social crises resulting from the failure to form a government make it necessary to reach an agreement on an institutionalized, transparent, and democratic model of governance that transcends party interests. The inability of Kurdish parties to act collectively in negotiations with Baghdad also weakens the Kurdistan Region’s bargaining power.

The failure of Kurdish political movements in the Kurdistan Region to develop common strategies affects not only Southern Kurdistan but all four parts of Kurdistan. Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria are experiencing closely interconnected processes. For this reason, every political crisis in Southern Kurdistan resonates throughout the other parts of Kurdistan.

The economic and political weakening of the Kurdistan Region, one of the Kurdish people’s most significant achievements, also diminishes Kurdish influence at the regional level. A weakened Kurdish position vis-à-vis Baghdad directly affects the regional policies of Ankara and Tehran as well.

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