From the shadows to supreme power: why Iran chose Ahmad Vahidi to lead its confrontation with the United States

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By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis Who Is Ahmad Vahidi? The Secretive IRGC Commander now shaping Iran's confrontation with the United States From the founding of the Quds Force to commanding the Revolutionary Guards, Ahmad Vahidi's rise signals a new era in Iran's military-led decision-making. As Tehran braces for a prolonged confrontation with Washington, one of Iran's most secretive and hardline military figures has emerged at the center of power—signaling a dramatic shift in how the Islamic Republic intends to wage its geopolitical struggle. Who is Ahmad Vahidi? Explore the rise of Iran's IRGC commander and how his growing influence could reshape Tehran's strategy toward the United States and the Middle East. For decades, Ahmad Vahidi remained largely behind the scenes, shaping Iran's military doctrine and regional strategy away from the public spotlight. Today, however, he stands at the heart of Iran's national security apparatus, overs...

Iraq's development road hits political turbulence: why PM Ali al-Zaidi publicly ordered his minister to sign in front of Erdoğan


By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Kurdish Policy Analysis

A Rare Public Confrontation in Ankara Reveals the Geopolitical Battle Behind Iraq's $17 Billion Trade Corridor

A public confrontation in Ankara exposes the political struggle behind Iraq's Development Road and the competing influence of Turkey and Iran.

A Diplomatic Ceremony Interrupted

What was intended to showcase a new chapter in Iraqi-Turkish economic cooperation instead exposed one of the deepest geopolitical divisions inside Iraq.

During an official ceremony in Ankara, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi publicly instructed Transport Minister Wahab al-Hasani to immediately sign a long-awaited agreement on Iraq's flagship Development Road Project after discovering the document had not yet been signed.

The unusual exchange occurred during a joint appearance with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, temporarily interrupting the signing ceremony before an international audience.

According to footage from the event, Al-Zaidi questioned his transport minister over the delay before instructing him to complete the agreement immediately. The Prime Minister then approached an interpreter and requested that President Erdoğan be informed that the Iraqi minister had been ordered to sign without further delay.

While the agreement was eventually signed, the incident highlighted political disagreements inside Baghdad that extend far beyond administrative procedures.

More Than a Transport Corridor

The Development Road is one of Iraq's most ambitious infrastructure projects in decades.

Designed to connect Grand Faw Port on the Gulf with Turkey through an extensive railway and highway network, the corridor aims to transform Iraq into one of the region's principal transit hubs linking Asia with Europe.

For Baghdad, the project is central to a broader economic strategy that seeks to:

  • Diversify government revenues beyond oil.
  • Attract billions of dollars in foreign investment.
  • Expand regional trade.
  • Position Iraq as a logistics bridge between the Gulf, Turkey, and European markets.

The project has become one of Prime Minister Al-Zaidi's signature economic initiatives.

Why Was the Agreement Delayed?

Neither the Iraqi government nor the Ministry of Transport immediately explained why the agreement had not been signed before the ceremony.

However, Iraqi political observers and media reports suggested the hesitation reflected internal political pressure rather than technical concerns.

According to these accounts, the transport minister—who has longstanding political ties to the Badr Organization led by Hadi al-Amiri—faced opposition from factions concerned about the strategic consequences of the Development Road.

Those critics reportedly argue that the corridor could weaken Iran's long-standing position as Iraq's primary overland transit route to the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.

Although these claims have not been officially confirmed, they reflect a broader geopolitical debate that has surrounded the project since its announcement.

Why Iran May View the Project Differently

From Tehran's perspective, Iraq has long represented both a strategic neighbour and an essential economic corridor.

The Development Road would redirect a significant share of regional trade toward Turkey and the Gulf, potentially reducing Iran's importance as a transit state for goods moving between Asia and Europe.

The proposed corridor crosses 11 Iraqi provinces—including Basra, Dhi Qar (Nasiriyah), Muthanna (Samawa), Diwaniyah, Najaf, Karbala, Baghdad, Salahaddin, Nineveh (Mosul), and Duhok—before reaching the Turkish border.

Most of these provinces have Shiite-majority populations, yet the completed corridor would ultimately strengthen Iraq's economic integration with Turkey, the Gulf states, and European markets.

Supporters see this as an opportunity to diversify Iraq's foreign partnerships.

Critics fear it could gradually reduce Iran's economic influence inside Iraq.

The Political Background

Transport Minister Wahab Salman al-Hasani has long been associated with the Badr Organization.

Before assuming ministerial office, he reportedly served as director of Hadi al-Amiri's office between 2003 and 2006 and later became a member of the organisation's leadership structures.

These longstanding political affiliations have intensified speculation that competing strategic priorities—not administrative delays—lay behind the hesitation witnessed in Ankara.

Whether or not that interpretation proves accurate, the public nature of the exchange demonstrated that Iraq's infrastructure policy is increasingly inseparable from regional geopolitics.

Al-Zaidi's Balancing Strategy

The incident comes during one of the busiest diplomatic periods of Prime Minister Al-Zaidi's premiership.

In recent weeks he has:

  • Secured major investment commitments during a visit to the United States.
  • Expanded transport cooperation with Iran.
  • Signed new agreements with Turkey.
  • Prepared for additional discussions with Saudi Arabia.

Rather than choosing one regional partner over another, Al-Zaidi appears to be pursuing a strategy of diversified economic diplomacy—strengthening relations simultaneously with Washington, Ankara, Riyadh, Tehran, and other regional actors.

The challenge lies in managing competing interests among Iraq's powerful political parties and armed factions, many of which maintain close relationships with neighbouring states.

Why the Development Road Matters Geopolitically

The Development Road is no longer simply an infrastructure project.

It has evolved into a test of Iraq's geopolitical orientation.

Supporters argue that the corridor will:

  • Transform Iraq into a regional logistics hub.
  • Reduce dependence on oil revenues.
  • Increase foreign investment.
  • Strengthen ties with Turkey and Gulf economies.
  • Improve Iraq's strategic importance within global supply chains.

Opponents, however, worry that the project may shift Iraq's economic centre of gravity away from Iran, altering decades of established regional trade patterns.

As a result, debates over transport infrastructure increasingly overlap with broader questions of national security and regional influence.

Future Implications

The public exchange in Ankara demonstrates that Iraq's largest economic projects are becoming political battlegrounds where domestic rivalries and regional competition intersect.

If Al-Zaidi succeeds in advancing the Development Road despite internal resistance, his government could fundamentally reshape Iraq's role in regional commerce while reducing the country's dependence on traditional energy revenues.

However, continued political opposition from influential factions may slow implementation, increase project costs, or complicate negotiations with international investors seeking political certainty.

The episode also highlights the growing strategic competition between Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf states over Iraq's future economic orientation. Rather than competing solely through military or diplomatic influence, regional powers are increasingly contesting control over trade corridors, infrastructure, and investment.

Future Scenarios

Scenario One: The Corridor Moves Forward (Most Likely)

Despite political disagreements, Baghdad proceeds with implementation. International investment continues, construction accelerates, and Iraq strengthens its position as a major trade gateway between Asia and Europe.

Scenario Two: Political Resistance Slows Progress

Internal disputes within Iraq delay implementation as competing political factions demand revisions to agreements or seek greater influence over the project's management.

Scenario Three: Regional Competition Intensifies

Iran, Turkey, and Gulf states expand their economic diplomacy inside Iraq, competing for influence over transport networks, energy projects, and logistics infrastructure while avoiding direct confrontation.

Scenario Four: Iraq Emerges as a Regional Logistics Hub

If successfully completed, the Development Road could transform Iraq from a country known primarily for oil exports into one of the Middle East's most important transport and trade corridors, significantly increasing its geopolitical leverage.

Further Reading

For more on why Baghdad considers the project strategically urgent, read our previous analysis: How Iraqi prime minister Ali Zaidi is quietly centralising Iraq's security state

To understand how competing political factions could influence the future of major strategic projects, read our analysis:  Iraq and Turkey deepen economic alliance


#Iraq #DevelopmentRoad #Turkey #Iran #MiddleEast #Trade #Geopolitics #Infrastructure

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