By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Germany’s military mission in Kurdistan has ended. Its departure tests whether the Peshmerga can replace the shrinking Western security umbrella with stronger indigenous institutions.

Germany’s military mission in the Kurdistan Region has ended, but the more consequential story is only beginning. The ceremony held at the Stefan military base at Erbil International Airport on August 25, attended by senior Kurdish, German and coalition officials, formally closed a German military chapter that began with the international campaign against the Islamic State. Yet Germany’s departure should not be understood simply as the withdrawal of another foreign contingent from Iraqi Kurdistan. It is a test of whether the Kurdistan Region can convert a decade of Western military assistance into a durable indigenous security architecture at precisely the moment when the Western security umbrella over northern Iraq is contracting.

That distinction matters. Germany's military presence in Kurdistan was never strategically important because of its numerical size. Its importance derived from what it represented: sustained European commitment to the Peshmerga, institutional military assistance, training, medical and logistical support, and participation in an international security architecture that gave the Kurdistan Region access to capabilities it could not independently generate. German forces helped train and equip Kurdish forces after ISIS seized large parts of Iraq in 2014, while German personnel also participated in advisory structures supporting Peshmerga reform. German parliamentary documents have specifically described German participation in the Multinational Advisory Group advising the Peshmerga Ministry on reform and German advisory support to Kurdish security forces.

The fact is therefore straightforward: the German military mission is ending. The assessment is more complicated: the end of the mission does not necessarily mean the end of German strategic engagement with Kurdistan. Berlin has repeatedly framed its relationship with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region in broader terms encompassing stabilization, institutional capacity-building and security cooperation. Germany's Foreign Office continues to describe military assistance to Iraq through the anti-ISIS coalition and NATO Mission Iraq alongside wider German stabilization and development engagement. The forecast, however, is more consequential: if Germany's departure is combined with the wider withdrawal of coalition infrastructure, air-defense systems and foreign military personnel, Erbil will face a fundamentally different security environment in which its own institutions must absorb responsibilities that were previously shared with international partners. That is why the ceremony at Stefan base should be read as a strategic transition rather than a farewell.

The End of Germany’s Mission Is Not the End of Germany’s Relationship With Kurdistan

Germany's military relationship with the Kurdistan Region emerged from the ISIS crisis, but it developed into something much larger than battlefield assistance. Berlin trained Peshmerga forces, supplied military equipment and supported the development of Kurdish security institutions. German involvement consequently became part of the international effort to transform the Peshmerga from a collection of politically affiliated forces into a more coherent regional security institution.

The historical record matters because it explains what Germany is actually leaving behind. German support began when the Peshmerga were fighting an existential war against ISIS and when the international coalition needed reliable ground partners. The German government described its training mission around Erbil as part of a broader effort to strengthen Iraqi and Kurdish forces against ISIS. A decade later, the military environment is dramatically different. ISIS no longer controls territory comparable to its 2014–17 peak, while the Peshmerga possess substantially greater operational experience and institutional capacity. But the threat environment has changed faster than the institutions designed to confront it.

The Peshmerga are no longer primarily preparing for a conventional ground battle against ISIS. They increasingly operate in an environment shaped by drones, missiles, Iranian pressure, militia activity, cyber threats, intelligence competition and the possibility of wider regional escalation. That is precisely why the departure of a training mission cannot be separated from the question of what capabilities remain after coalition forces reduce their presence.

KPA's earlier analysis, [Germany’s Military Withdrawal From Erbil Signals a New Phase in Western Strategy Toward Iraq], identified this transformation before the current ceremony: Germany's decision to reduce its military footprint reflected a shift away from exposed forward deployments toward smaller advisory missions, force protection and diplomatic engagement.

The ceremony now provides the physical manifestation of that transition. Germany is not necessarily abandoning Kurdistan. But Germany is no longer prepared to maintain the same military footprint in Kurdistan. Those are very different propositions.

The More Important Withdrawal Is the One Happening Around Germany

The strategic significance of Germany's departure becomes clearer when placed alongside the broader contraction of the coalition presence.

KPA's August analysis, [Allied Coalition Withdraws From Erbil as Surveillance Balloon and Patriot Air Defenses Are Removed], examined the withdrawal of critical coalition surveillance and air-defense assets from Erbil. The article argued that the removal of Patriot and surveillance capabilities represented more than routine redeployment because those systems had provided an additional defensive layer for coalition personnel and critical infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region.

That development is more consequential than the departure of several dozen German personnel. A military adviser can be replaced. A sophisticated integrated air-defense architecture is much harder to replace.

The distinction is strategically important because the Kurdistan Region's security problem has increasingly shifted from counterinsurgency to deterrence. The Peshmerga can patrol territory, conduct ground operations and fight terrorist cells. They cannot, by themselves, reproduce the full range of radar, missile-defense, intelligence and early-warning capabilities previously provided by the international coalition.

Recent events have demonstrated the danger of that gap. Reuters reported in March that a drone attack struck a joint Peshmerga-French military base in Makhmour, injuring French soldiers. Another Reuters report documented a deliberate strike against an Italian military facility in Erbil during the same period of heightened regional tension. Those attacks reveal a critical change in the strategic environment.

Foreign forces in Kurdistan are no longer simply trainers operating in a relatively permissive post-ISIS environment. They can become targets because of their governments' broader regional policies. That creates a dilemma for European governments.

The longer they maintain exposed military installations, the greater the force-protection burden becomes. But the more rapidly they withdraw, the greater the perception that Western deterrence is weakening. Germany's decision sits directly inside that dilemma.

The Peshmerga Reform Has Become a Strategic Deadline

The most important consequence of Germany's withdrawal may therefore have little to do with Germany itself. It may be the acceleration of Peshmerga reform.

For years, international partners have urged the Kurdistan Region to unify its military forces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. That process has moved forward, but political divisions between the KDP and PUK have continued to complicate the creation of a genuinely unified command structure.

KPA's May analysis, [US-Backed Deal Sets September Deadline for Peshmerga Unification], reported that an agreement with the United States established September 2026 as the final deadline for bringing partisan Peshmerga structures under the authority of the Peshmerga Ministry.

The timing is extraordinary. The international coalition is withdrawing. Germany is ending its military mission. Western air-defense capabilities are being reduced. And at almost exactly the same moment, the Peshmerga are expected to complete a reform process designed to make them a unified regional military institution. This is not coincidence. It is the strategic logic of transition.

External actors can provide training, equipment and advice for years, but eventually the partner institution must assume responsibility for itself. The Peshmerga reform process was never supposed to be permanent foreign management of Kurdish security forces. Its objective was to create an institution capable of functioning after the international military presence became smaller.

The latest U.S. oversight reporting illustrates both the progress and the difficulty. The Lead Inspector General reported that the Peshmerga reform plan envisaged the gradual transfer of the remaining personnel from the partisan 70 and 80 Forces to the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs by the end of September 2026, while noting that political alignments continued to complicate reform. The implication is clear. September is not merely an administrative deadline. It is becoming a test of Kurdish strategic maturity.

A Unified Peshmerga Is More Important After Germany Leaves

KPA's most recent analysis, [Where Is the Kurdistan Peshmerga Reform Process Heading?], examined precisely this problem. The article highlighted the continuing political obstacles to unification while noting that a significant number of joint brigades have already been brought under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.

The strategic choice facing Erbil is increasingly stark. The Kurdistan Region can either treat Peshmerga reform as another bureaucratic project that advances when political conditions permit, or it can recognize that the changing international environment has made reform a matter of national security.

A unified command structure provides more than administrative efficiency. It improves intelligence sharing. It improves procurement. It improves logistics. It improves operational planning. It improves coordination with Baghdad. And perhaps most importantly, it makes it easier for foreign governments to continue supporting the Peshmerga without becoming entangled in Kurdish party competition.

A divided security force is difficult for international partners to institutionalize. A unified security force is much easier to train, equip and coordinate with. Germany's departure should therefore strengthen the political argument for Peshmerga unification rather than weaken it.

Kurdistan’s Air-Defense Problem Is More Dangerous Than Its Ground-Force Problem

The biggest mistake Erbil could make would be to measure the consequences of the Western withdrawal only in terms of Peshmerga manpower and conventional weapons. The most urgent capability gap is above the battlefield.

KPA's recent analysis, [Kurdistan’s Air Defense Crisis Exposes the Cost of America’s Military Drawdown] argued that the Region's vulnerability is increasingly defined by its dependence on external protection against drones and missiles. The article highlighted the growing number of aerial attacks and the political significance of strikes against strategic and political targets.

A second KPA analysis, [Erbil’s New Air-Defense Reality: What the Latest Drone Attack Reveals About Kurdistan’s Vulnerability], argued that Kurdistan needs a layered architecture based on early warning, radar coverage, electronic warfare, counter-drone systems and integration with Iraqi air-defense structures.

This is where the German withdrawal becomes part of a much larger strategic problem. The Peshmerga were built for a war in which territory mattered most. The emerging security environment is one in which airspace, infrastructure and information matter just as much as territory. A drone does not need to defeat a Peshmerga brigade. It only needs to reach an airport, power station, oil facility, military headquarters or political target. That changes the definition of security.

It also changes what Kurdistan should be asking from Germany and other European partners. The objective should no longer simply be more trainers. It should be technology transfer, intelligence cooperation, air-defense expertise, counter-drone capabilities, electronic warfare, military education and institutional development. That would be a more sustainable post-deployment partnership.

Baghdad Is Becoming More Important as the Coalition Becomes Smaller

The contraction of the Western security presence also increases the importance of Baghdad-Erbil security coordination. This is one of the areas where the end of Germany's mission could produce an unexpected opportunity.

KPA's June analysis, [Baghdad and Erbil’s New Security Pact: Why Protecting Foreign Oil Companies Could Reshape Iraq’s Political Order], examined growing military coordination between Baghdad and Erbil, including discussions involving the Iraqi army and Peshmerga.

That relationship will become more important as foreign forces withdraw. For years, coalition institutions provided an additional layer of coordination between Iraqi federal forces and the Peshmerga. As that layer disappears, Baghdad and Erbil will have fewer excuses for failing to develop direct mechanisms for intelligence sharing, border security, counterterrorism and protection of strategic infrastructure.

This does not mean Baghdad should absorb the Peshmerga. Nor does it mean Erbil should seek complete military independence from Iraq. The strategic objective should instead be institutional interoperability. A professional Peshmerga force operating within Iraq's constitutional framework can become an asset to Iraqi national security rather than an obstacle to it. That distinction becomes particularly important as Baghdad confronts the wider question of armed groups.

KPA's August analysis, [Iraq’s Disarmament Crisis: Why Baghdad’s Push Against Militias Could Collide With the Peshmerga Question], warned against treating the constitutionally recognized Peshmerga as equivalent to Iran-backed militias operating within Iraq's fragmented security environment.

The distinction is strategically essential. Peshmerga reform should mean professionalization and unification, not dissolution. Militia reform should mean state authority and accountability, not the weakening of one of the country's established regional security institutions. Confusing those two questions could produce exactly the opposite of what Baghdad claims to want: a weaker Iraqi state with greater leverage for the actors most capable of exploiting security vacuums.

Germany’s Departure Also Changes the Political Meaning of Western Presence

There is a less tangible dimension to Germany's withdrawal that deserves attention: perception. Foreign military forces do not only provide capabilities. They provide signals.

A German soldier stationed in Erbil communicates that Berlin considers the security of the Kurdistan Region sufficiently important to accept military risk. A German advisory team working from a diplomatic facility communicates something different: Germany remains engaged, but its exposure and willingness to place personnel in harm's way have declined. Neither signal should be exaggerated. But neither should be ignored.

KPA's July analysis, [Germany’s Military Withdrawal From Erbil Signals a New Phase in Western Strategy Toward Iraq], argued that Berlin's decision reflected a broader shift toward smaller advisory missions and diplomatic engagement rather than permanent forward deployments.

That model may actually prove more sustainable. The question is whether the Kurdistan Region can extract maximum strategic value from it. Germany has extensive experience in military professionalization, institutional reform, logistics, medical support and defense education. The next phase of German-Kurdish security cooperation should therefore focus on those areas where Germany can have disproportionate institutional impact without maintaining a vulnerable military base.

The relationship should become smaller militarily but deeper institutionally. That is the opportunity.

The Peshmerga Cannot Be Both Politically Divided and Strategically Autonomous

There is, however, an uncomfortable conclusion that Erbil needs to confront. Kurdistan cannot demand strategic autonomy while maintaining fragmented military institutions. The external security environment is becoming less forgiving. Iran has demonstrated its willingness to strike targets in the Kurdistan Region. Iran-aligned Iraqi groups have demonstrated their willingness to target coalition personnel and facilities. The United States is reducing its military footprint. European governments are reassessing the risks associated with forward deployments.

Under these circumstances, political fragmentation inside the Peshmerga becomes more dangerous than it was when a large coalition security umbrella existed.

KPA's analysis, [The Future of Kurdistan in the Middle East], argued that the strategic objective should be institutionalization rather than demilitarization, with greater indigenous capability in air defense, intelligence, counter-drone systems, cyber protection and critical infrastructure security.

Germany's withdrawal reinforces that argument. Kurdistan does not need to become militarily self-sufficient. That would be unrealistic. It needs to become strategically resilient. There is a difference.

Strategic resilience means having sufficient indigenous capability to absorb a shock without immediately requiring foreign military intervention. It means that if a coalition base closes, the Region does not lose its entire security architecture with it. It means that if foreign air defenses leave, Kurdish and Iraqi systems can still provide warning and some degree of protection. It means that if Western advisers withdraw, Kurdish institutions retain the knowledge and organizational capacity they helped create. That is the real measure of whether the international mission succeeded.

The Coalition’s Departure Could Strengthen Kurdistan — If Erbil Uses It Correctly

The instinctive reaction to foreign military withdrawal is usually negative. But withdrawal can also create an opportunity.

For more than a decade, the presence of international forces gave Kurdish leaders a powerful external security guarantee. It also made it easier to postpone difficult domestic decisions. When foreign governments provide intelligence, air defense, training and operational support, the political urgency to build those capabilities locally is inevitably reduced.

That cushion is now disappearing. The result could be dangerous. But it could also be transformative. Germany's departure forces Erbil to answer questions that can no longer be deferred: Who commands the Peshmerga? Who controls intelligence? Who protects critical infrastructure? Who provides early warning? How will Kurdish forces coordinate with Baghdad? What happens when another regional conflict spills into Iraqi airspace?

Those questions are uncomfortable precisely because they go to the heart of state capacity. The forecast is therefore that the Kurdistan Region will increasingly move from a model of external security dependence toward security partnership. The difference is important. Dependence assumes that the external actor provides the decisive capability. Partnership assumes that both sides bring capabilities to the relationship.

Germany can remain a partner. The United States can remain a partner. Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands can remain partners. But the Peshmerga must increasingly become the primary institutional owner of Kurdish security.

The Most Important German Legacy May Be What Remains After Germany Leaves

The symbolism of the ceremony at Stefan base should not obscure the practical question. What exactly remains when the German military mission ends?

If what remains is a more professional Peshmerga force, stronger military institutions, better interoperability with Baghdad, improved command structures and a durable German advisory relationship, then Germany's withdrawal will represent the successful completion of one phase of a long-term partnership. If what remains is a security vacuum, fragmented command structures and dependence on foreign air defenses, then the withdrawal will expose the limits of a decade of international assistance.

The difference will be determined in Erbil, not Berlin. Germany has already done much of what an external military partner can reasonably be expected to do. It trained, equipped, advised and supported the Peshmerga. German parliamentary records explicitly connect its mission to the broader objective of enabling Iraqi institutions to assume greater responsibility for security.

The next phase therefore belongs to Kurdish policymakers. They must finish Peshmerga unification. They must build layered air defense. They must institutionalize intelligence. They must strengthen Baghdad-Erbil military coordination. And they must preserve Western partnerships without assuming that Western troops will remain indefinitely.

A New Security Bargain for Kurdistan

The end of Germany's military mission should ultimately lead to a new security bargain between Kurdistan, Baghdad and its Western partners. For Baghdad, that means recognizing that a professionalized Peshmerga can strengthen rather than weaken Iraq's security architecture.

For Erbil, it means accepting that constitutional security responsibilities require institutional discipline, unified command and greater domestic capacity. For Germany, it means maintaining the strategic relationship even as the military footprint becomes smaller.

For Washington and other coalition members, it means ensuring that the transition from military presence to security partnership does not leave critical gaps in air defense, intelligence and counterterrorism. And for the Peshmerga, the message is the simplest and most difficult of all: The era in which foreign partners could compensate for Kurdish institutional divisions is ending. Germany's departure is therefore not evidence that Kurdistan has become less important.

It is evidence that the nature of the relationship is changing. The Peshmerga were once needed because ISIS was advancing toward Erbil. Today, they are needed because the security environment around Kurdistan is becoming more complex. The threat has changed. The partnership must change with it. The German flag coming down at Stefan base should not therefore be read as the end of a strategic relationship. It should be read as the end of one form of that relationship.

The real question is whether Erbil can ensure that what comes next is stronger than what came before. That will require Kurdistan to do something it has historically struggled to do: convert military necessity into institutional unity. If it succeeds, Germany's withdrawal could become a milestone in the maturation of the Kurdistan Region's security institutions. If it fails, the withdrawal will instead become a symbol of something far more troubling — the moment when the Western security umbrella receded faster than Kurdish institutions could replace it. The Western military era in Kurdistan is ending. The era of Kurdish strategic responsibility is beginning.

Key Pathways for Future Cooperation

• Direct Bilateral Agreements: Baghdad and Erbil can establish formal, independent and bilateral defense protocols with Berlin that outline customized security assistance, replacing the expiring mandate of the U.S.-led coalition. 

• Specialized Capacity Building: Future programs can transition toward high-level, non-combat technical instruction, focusing on logistics, military medicine, equipment maintenance, and intelligence sharing rather than on-the-ground tactical advising.

• Institutional Security Reform: Germany can support structural reforms within both the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Ministry of Peshmerga, helping institutionalize professional military standards, command unification, and modern administrative governance. 

• Equipment and Maintenance Support: Bilateral arrangements can facilitate the upkeep, servicing, and supply of previously donated German military hardware (such as armored vehicles and tactical gear) used by security forces to counter ISIS remnants.

• Diplomatic and Humanitarian Synergy: Broadening security collaboration to include cyber defense, border security technology, and continued humanitarian cooperation will maintain strong strategic ties between Berlin, Baghdad, and Erbil.

• Ali Al-Zaidi, the Iraqi prime minister stressed the need to develop broader partnerships with the international coalition’s member countries. He praised Germany for aiding Iraq in its battle against terrorism, notably during the confrontation with ISIS.

Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a geopolitical and security analyst and the founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis (KPA). His research and analysis focus on Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, regional security, energy geopolitics and the changing strategic order of the Middle East.

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