Kurdish Policy Analysis

Sulaimani, Kurdistan Region of Iraq — September 5, 2026

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has reached a defining moment in its political development. Nearly two years after the October 2024 parliamentary elections, the Kurdistan Regional Government still does not have a new cabinet, the Kurdistan Parliament has struggled to resume normal institutional activity, and the two dominant Kurdish parties remain divided over the political architecture of the next government.

What began as a familiar dispute between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has become something considerably more consequential. The crisis now concerns not only cabinet positions, but the distribution of political authority, control of security institutions, relations with Baghdad, economic governance, parliamentary legitimacy, and ultimately the future structure of Kurdish autonomy.

The most important question is therefore no longer simply when the KDP and PUK will form a government. It is whether the political system that governed the Kurdistan Region for two decades can survive in its current form. This is the central question of KRG internal governance.

The Current Status: A Deadlock That Has Not Yet Been Resolved

The October 2024 parliamentary election produced a clear political hierarchy but not a governing majority. The KDP won 39 of the 100 elected seats, while the PUK won 23. The New Generation Movement secured 15 seats, followed by other opposition and minority forces. Neither of the two dominant parties, however, could govern alone.

The result was a political paradox. The election produced a stronger KDP, but the political system still required a partnership with the PUK. That partnership never materialized into a new cabinet.

Kurdistan therefore entered a prolonged period in which the institutions of government continued to operate while the political process required to establish a new government remained incomplete. As this publication argued in The Government That Never Arrived: Can Kurdistan Break Its Political Deadlock Before Governance Becomes the Crisis?, the problem gradually shifted from coalition bargaining into a question of institutional legitimacy.

By April, the rupture had become much more serious. In KDP–PUK Political Break Signals Collapse of Kurdish Power-Sharing as Government Talks Freeze, the breakdown was described as a possible transition from conventional coalition politics toward parallel political centers.

That assessment was reinforced when a senior PUK official stated that there was effectively no political relationship between the two parties and that dialogue was occurring mainly when outside actors intervened. Yet the story did not end there.

During July, contacts resumed. A PUK delegation visited the KDP's Organization Bureau in Erbil, and KDP officials publicly emphasized that the historic relationship between the two parties could still be managed through dialogue.

In August, the political temperature appeared to change further. Senior KDP officials said that recent discussions had produced significant progress toward forming the next government and reactivating parliament.

By late August, KDP spokesperson Mahmoud Mohammed said that political bureaus from both parties would meet, followed by a summit between the two leaderships. He also stressed that negotiations remained the only realistic mechanism for resolving the outstanding disputes.

The significance of these developments should not be overstated. There is renewed political contact, but there is still no completed political settlement. The tenth KRG cabinet remains unformed. That distinction is essential. Kurdistan has moved from complete political disengagement toward renewed negotiation. It has not yet moved from negotiation toward institutional settlement.

How the KDP–PUK Crisis Became a Governance Crisis

The easiest way to understand the current deadlock is to treat it as a dispute over ministries. That explanation is incomplete. The deeper disagreement concerns the meaning of political partnership itself.

For much of the post-2003 period, the KDP and PUK operated according to an implicit political formula. The KDP possessed greater influence in Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK retained its historical political base in Sulaymaniyah. Government formation therefore depended upon a negotiated balance between electoral strength, territorial influence, institutional control, and historical legitimacy.

That formula worked because both parties accepted limits. The KDP accepted that electoral dominance could not translate into complete control. The PUK accepted that power-sharing did not necessarily mean institutional equality in every domain. That equilibrium is now under pressure.

The KDP's electoral victory strengthened its argument that political authority should reflect electoral weight. The PUK, meanwhile, increasingly argues that meaningful partnership must involve substantial influence over executive and security institutions. This disagreement is at the heart of the crisis.

As examined in How to Solve the Government Crisis in the Kurdistan Region?, the dispute over the Ministry of Interior and security institutions is not simply a contest for cabinet portfolios. It reflects competing visions of who should control the machinery of regional government.

That is why negotiations have proved so difficult. If the disagreement were only about the number of ministries each party receives, a compromise would have been relatively straightforward. Instead, the parties are negotiating the future balance of power.

From Power-Sharing to Competitive Governance

The KDP–PUK relationship is undergoing a structural transformation. For decades, Kurdish politics operated according to an informal principle: Compete internally, unite externally.

That formula was never perfect. The two parties maintained separate organizations, networks, security structures, economic interests and political identities. But when the strategic interests of the Kurdistan Region were threatened, the parties generally understood the value of presenting a unified position. That principle is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

The April crisis illustrated how far the relationship had deteriorated. In Kurdish Presidency Dispute Exposes Deep Rift: Power Sharing, Legitimacy, and the KDP–PUK Struggle Inside Iraq’s Political System, the dispute over the Iraqi presidency demonstrated that the rivalry was no longer confined to Erbil. It had entered Baghdad.

The same problem was explored in Iraq’s Kurdish Presidency Test: PUK and KDP Warn Against Breaking Political “Customs” Ahead of Critical Vote and Iraq Elects New President After Secret Deals and Kurdish Power Struggle.

The consequences became even clearer in KDP Challenges Iraqi Presidency Vote, Raising Stakes Amid U.S.–Iran Diplomacy.

These disputes matter because Kurdish influence in Baghdad has historically depended on coordination between the major parties. When that coordination weakens, the Kurdish political bloc becomes easier to divide. The resulting problem is larger than party rivalry. It is a problem of strategic representation.

The Geography of Political Power

The most serious long-term danger is that political disagreement becomes institutionalized geographically. The Kurdistan Region formally has one government. Politically, however, it continues to contain two powerful systems of influence. The KDP dominates much of Erbil and Duhok. The PUK remains deeply rooted in Sulaymaniyah and the surrounding areas.

This does not mean that Kurdistan has formally returned to the separate administrations of the 1990s. It has not. But the longer the political deadlock continues, the greater the risk that institutional practices begin to reproduce a similar pattern.

This was the central warning in KDP–PUK Political Break Signals Collapse of Kurdish Power-Sharing as Government Talks Freeze.

The danger is gradual rather than dramatic. There may be no declaration of partition. There may be no new civil conflict. Instead, parallel political networks can gradually become normal. Separate administrative influence produces separate interests. Separate interests produce separate institutions. Separate institutions eventually make political reintegration more difficult. That is why the question of internal governance has become inseparable from the question of Kurdish unity.

Parliament: The Missing Link

A functioning government requires a functioning parliament. The prolonged weakness of parliamentary institutions is therefore one of the most important consequences of the KDP–PUK deadlock. The problem is not merely procedural.

Parliament is the institution through which electoral legitimacy is converted into legislative authority. When parliament cannot perform its full constitutional role, political bargaining shifts away from formal institutions and toward party negotiations. That strengthens political elites while weakening institutions. The result is a dangerous feedback loop. The weaker parliament becomes, the more important party negotiations become. The more important party negotiations become, the weaker formal institutions become.

This is the institutional trap explored in The Parliament Trap: How Kurdistan’s Political Deadlock Is Becoming a Structural Crisis of Governance.

The crisis therefore cannot be solved simply by distributing ministries. Kurdistan needs to restore the institutional chain connecting voters, parliament, government, law and accountability. Without that chain, elections risk becoming moments of political competition without producing effective institutional authority.

Security Is the Hardest Part of the Bargain

The most sensitive dimension of KDP–PUK competition remains security. The Kurdistan Region has made significant efforts over the years to integrate the Peshmerga under regional institutions. Yet partisan security structures and political loyalties remain an enduring problem.

The dispute over the Interior Ministry is therefore only one component of a much larger issue. Who controls internal security? Who controls intelligence? Who appoints senior commanders? Who determines security policy? And, ultimately, does the Kurdistan Region possess one security system or several institutions operating under a common legal umbrella? These questions have become more important as the regional security environment has deteriorated.

The Kurdistan Region borders Iran, Turkey and Syria while remaining deeply connected to the Iraqi federal security architecture. It has also become increasingly exposed to regional conflict.

A politically divided security structure therefore creates vulnerabilities that extend far beyond domestic politics. The Peshmerga question is especially important because external actors increasingly expect the Kurdistan Region to operate as a coherent security partner.

Political fragmentation undermines that expectation. It also strengthens the argument of those in Baghdad who believe security authority should ultimately be more centralized at the federal level.

Baghdad Is Becoming Part of the Governance Equation

The KDP–PUK crisis cannot be separated from the changing relationship between Erbil and Baghdad. For years, Kurdish autonomy rested partly on the ability of the Kurdistan Region to negotiate collectively with the federal government. That leverage is weaker when Kurdish parties disagree.

The consequences can be seen across several areas: budget transfers, public-sector salaries, oil exports, customs, constitutional disputes and federal security policy. As argued in KDP–PUK Impasse: Kurdistan Governance Evolution 2026–2031, prolonged political fragmentation could gradually produce federal re-centralization even without any formal constitutional change.

This is perhaps the most important strategic consequence of the current crisis. Autonomy does not disappear only when a constitution is amended. It can also weaken when regional institutions become increasingly dependent on federal mechanisms. That process can occur through budgets. It can occur through salaries. It can occur through energy policy. It can occur through security coordination. And it can occur through political mediation.

The more frequently Kurdish parties require Baghdad or external actors to mediate internal disputes, the more the center gains influence over the periphery.

The Economic Cost of Political Paralysis

Governance is also an economic question. Investors require predictability. Businesses require functioning institutions. Long-term infrastructure requires policy continuity. International partners require reliable government counterparts. The Kurdistan Region has enormous economic potential, from energy and agriculture to tourism, logistics, construction and regional trade. But potential is not enough. Investment depends on institutional confidence. Political paralysis weakens that confidence.

This is particularly important because the Kurdistan Region is simultaneously attempting to pursue ambitious long-term development strategies.

The vision presented in the Region's major development and urban-planning initiatives requires continuity across political cycles. A government that remains trapped in negotiations cannot easily execute a coherent multi-year economic strategy. The crisis therefore creates an uncomfortable contradiction. Kurdistan is increasingly thinking in decades while its political institutions remain trapped in the unresolved consequences of one election.

The Opposition and the Third-Party Problem

The KDP–PUK system is not operating in a political vacuum. The New Generation Movement, Kurdistan Islamic Union and other opposition forces possess parliamentary influence and can affect the arithmetic of government formation. The Kurdistan Islamic Union has become particularly important because it has increasingly positioned itself as a mediator rather than simply another opposition force.

This role was examined in Kurdistan’s Silent Kingmaker: How the Islamic Union Became the Decisive Force in the KDP–PUK Power War.

More recently, the Islamic Union has attempted to bring the two dominant parties back toward negotiations. Its initiative reportedly emphasizes reducing the media confrontation, establishing a timetable for reactivating parliament and forming the tenth cabinet, and coordinating Kurdish positions toward Baghdad. This is significant.

It demonstrates that the crisis has reached a point where the two dominant parties may require a third political actor to help rebuild trust. That alone is evidence of how deeply the old power-sharing model has deteriorated.

A Crisis of Legitimacy, Not Simply a Crisis of Cabinets

The longer this crisis continues, the more difficult it becomes to describe it merely as government formation. The deeper issue is legitimacy. As explored in Kurdish Power Fractures: How Internal Rivalries Are Weakening the KRG at a Historic Political Crossroads, prolonged rivalry weakens not only political cooperation but also the credibility of regional institutions.

The same concern was developed further in Governance Without Legitimacy: Is Iraqi Kurdistan Entering an Era of Political Stagnation?. A political system derives legitimacy from more than elections. It requires functioning institutions. It requires public services. It requires predictable salaries. It requires accountability. It requires the perception that political competition ultimately produces governance.

If citizens repeatedly see elections followed by prolonged institutional paralysis, democratic legitimacy can weaken even when elections themselves remain competitive. That is a serious warning for the future.

From April's Rupture to August's Rapprochement

The trajectory of 2026 is revealing. In April, the political relationship appeared close to collapse. In KDP–PUK Political Break Signals Collapse of Kurdish Power-Sharing as Government Talks Freeze, the possibility of prolonged parallel governance appeared increasingly plausible.

In May, the KDP began a renewed political initiative to break the deadlock, as discussed in Kurdistan at a Crossroads: KDP Launches New Drive to Break Political Deadlock and Restore Governance.

The crisis nevertheless continued, prompting analysis of Kurdistan Power Struggle Deepens as KDP–PUK Deadlock Enters 16th Month and the wider fragmentation examined in Kurdish Power Fractures.

The dispute also spilled into Baghdad, where the presidency became another arena for Kurdish competition. Barzani’s Missed Meeting Exposes Deepening Kurdish Rift Over Iraq Presidency illustrated how internal Kurdish disputes were increasingly affecting federal politics.

By June, the central question had become how the crisis could actually be resolved. That was the focus of PUK Says ‘Ready for Any Attempt’ to Pass KRG Cabinet Formation Deadlock and How to Solve the Government Crisis in the Kurdistan Region?.

By late June, the crisis had become sufficiently structural to justify looking beyond immediate negotiations toward the Region's longer-term political trajectory. That was the argument developed in KDP–PUK Impasse: Kurdistan Governance Evolution 2026–2031.

The subsequent July and August developments suggest that the political system has not broken completely. But neither has it been repaired.

The Current Status: Negotiations Are Back, but the Old System Has Not Been Restored

As of September 5, 2026, the most accurate description of the situation is fragile political rapprochement without a final settlement. The parties are talking again. The possibility of high-level negotiations has returned. There are indications that both sides understand the costs of continued paralysis. But the fundamental disputes remain. The tenth cabinet has not been formed. Parliament has not fully returned to normal institutional functioning.

The parties still disagree over the distribution of executive authority. Security institutions remain politically sensitive. And the question of how much power each party should possess inside a future government remains unresolved. Recent reporting confirms that KDP–PUK negotiations remain active, with renewed meetings expected and pressure growing to reactivate parliament and establish the tenth cabinet. The situation is therefore better than the political rupture of April. But it is not yet a political settlement. That distinction will determine what happens next.

Three Possible Futures

1. A New Power-Sharing Agreement

The most constructive outcome would be a negotiated political compact between the KDP and PUK. Such an agreement would not simply divide ministries. It would need to establish principles for executive authority, security-sector reform, parliamentary functioning, economic coordination and relations with Baghdad. This would represent a new version of Kurdish power-sharing rather than a return to the old formula.

2. Managed Dual Governance

A second possibility is prolonged compromise without genuine institutional integration. The parties could eventually establish a cabinet while retaining strong parallel political structures. This would produce stability without resolving the underlying problem. Kurdistan would remain formally unified but politically divided. This may be the easiest short-term compromise and the most dangerous long-term solution.

3. Institutional Fragmentation and Federal Re-Centralization

The worst outcome would be continued paralysis. If the parties remain unable to establish a functioning government, Baghdad will inevitably gain additional influence over areas of regional governance. The Kurdistan Region could remain autonomous constitutionally while becoming increasingly constrained administratively and financially. This is the scenario in which autonomy survives on paper but loses strategic substance.

What Must Change?

The KDP and PUK cannot solve this crisis simply by agreeing on who receives which ministry. They need a new political contract.

First, both parties need to accept that electoral strength and power-sharing are not mutually exclusive principles. The KDP's electoral victory should translate into meaningful executive authority, but that authority cannot eliminate the PUK's claim to genuine partnership.

Second, security institutions need to become increasingly institutional rather than partisan. The long-term credibility of the Kurdistan Region requires a unified security architecture that answers to regional institutions rather than political parties.

Third, parliament must return to the center of political life. Party negotiations may produce agreements, but democratic institutions must ultimately provide legitimacy.

Fourth, the KDP and PUK need a common strategy toward Baghdad. A divided Kurdish position will continue to weaken regional bargaining power at precisely the moment when federal institutions possess greater financial and administrative leverage.

Finally, the political parties need to recognize that governance itself is becoming the source of legitimacy.

Kurdish society is increasingly interested not only in historical political narratives but in salaries, employment, infrastructure, education, healthcare, investment, corruption and public services. The next phase of Kurdish politics will therefore be judged increasingly by performance.

The Bigger Question: What Kind of Kurdistan Is Being Built?

The KDP–PUK crisis is ultimately a debate about the political model of the Kurdistan Region.

For decades, Kurdish autonomy survived through a combination of political pragmatism, elite bargaining, international protection, economic opportunity and strategic competition between the two major parties.

That model delivered important achievements. But it was never fully institutionalized. Too much depended on relationships between political leaders. Too much depended on informal understandings. Too much depended on the willingness of competing parties to restrain themselves. The current crisis demonstrates the limits of that model.

The Kurdistan Region now needs to move from party-managed autonomy toward institution-based autonomy. That does not mean eliminating political parties. It means ensuring that political parties operate through institutions rather than institutions operating through political parties. This distinction will define the next chapter of Kurdish politics.

As argued in The Future of Iraqi Kurdistan After 2030, the Region is entering a new political era in which the balance between the KDP and PUK will interact with broader questions of economic reform, governance and regional competition.

The same logic is visible in Government and Political System of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which demonstrates that understanding Kurdistan's political future requires understanding its institutions, constitutional framework and party system together.

And as argued in Understanding the Kurdistan Region: The Political Puzzle at the Heart of Iraq and the Middle East, the Region's unique political structure is precisely what makes the current crisis so consequential.

Conclusion: Kurdistan Cannot Govern Through Deadlock Forever

The KDP–PUK crisis has lasted long enough to expose the central weakness of Kurdistan's political system. The Region possesses institutions, but those institutions remain heavily dependent on political consensus between two parties. It possesses elections, but elections have not yet produced a fully functioning government. It possesses autonomy, but internal fragmentation risks increasing dependence on Baghdad. It possesses enormous economic and geopolitical potential, but political uncertainty makes that potential harder to convert into durable strategic power.

The encouraging development is that the political relationship has not collapsed permanently. After months of confrontation, the KDP and PUK are once again moving toward dialogue. The mediation efforts of other Kurdish political actors have helped create space for renewed negotiations. There remains a realistic possibility that the two parties can reach an agreement and finally establish the tenth KRG cabinet.

But the central lesson of the past two years is that forming another cabinet will not, by itself, solve the problem. Kurdistan needs a new governance settlement. It needs institutions strong enough to survive political rivalry. It needs security institutions that belong to the Region rather than to individual parties. It needs a parliament capable of exercising its constitutional role. It needs a unified strategy toward Baghdad.

And it needs political leaders willing to understand that preserving Kurdish autonomy requires institutional unity even when political competition remains intense. The KDP and PUK do not need to become one party. They do not even need to agree on everything.

But they must agree on one fundamental principle: Kurdistan cannot remain politically divided at the level of institutions and expect to remain strategically strong at the level of the region. The real test of the current negotiations is therefore not whether Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani can reach another temporary agreement.

It is whether they can build a political system in which the next disagreement does not once again bring the entire Kurdistan Region to a standstill. That is the real meaning of KRG internal governance. And that is the decision now confronting Kurdistan.

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a political analyst and the founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, focusing on Kurdish politics, Iraq, Iran, regional security, geopolitics and strategic affairs. He holds a PhD in English Literature from Brunel University London, where his research focused on war literature, and has extensive experience in higher education, international relations, policy research and geopolitical analysis.

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