Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis

Turkey’s Kurdish conflict may finally be entering a fundamentally different phase. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is moving toward dissolution, Syria’s Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have ended their existence as an independent military force, and Ankara is turning disarmament into a formal legal process. What once appeared to be separate Kurdish conflicts across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran are increasingly becoming parts of a single strategic transformation.

The most important question, however, is not whether the guns are falling silent. It is whether the political order that follows can survive after the strategic circumstances that produced it disappear.

The distinction is critical. Turkey may have achieved a major security breakthrough without yet resolving the Kurdish question. Syrian Kurds may have preserved important cultural and political rights while surrendering the autonomous institutions that gave them leverage. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq may emerge from the process with greater security and economic opportunities, but it could also find itself navigating a new regional order in which Ankara, Baghdad, and Damascus possess greater control over Kurdish strategic space.

The emerging settlement is therefore less a peace treaty than a convergence of interests. Ankara wants to eliminate the PKK as a security threat. Damascus wants to restore centralized state authority. Washington wants to reduce its military footprint while preserving influence over Syria’s political transition. Kurdish actors want to avoid another catastrophic regional war while converting military achievements into political rights.

For the moment, those interests overlap.

That is why the process is moving so quickly.

The Regional Environment Finally Changed

The transformation did not begin in 2026. Its roots lie in the strategic changes that followed the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the weakening of the Syrian Kurdish military position, the evolution of Abdullah Öcalan’s political strategy, and the gradual transformation of Turkey’s relationship with the Kurdistan Region.

The changing Turkish-Kurdish relationship was already becoming visible earlier this year. In Could Shifts in Iraqi Kurdistan Turn Former Foes into Turkish Partners?, I argued that Ankara was increasingly attempting to transform parts of Iraqi Kurdistan from a zone of confrontation into a zone of strategic partnership. The logic was not that historical tensions had disappeared, but that Turkey's interests were expanding beyond counterinsurgency toward energy, trade, infrastructure, and regional connectivity.

That transformation has now become more consequential.

For decades, Turkey approached the Kurdish question primarily through security. The PKK provided the central organizing principle of that strategy. Its presence in northern Iraq allowed Ankara to justify cross-border military operations, while its connections to Kurdish organizations in Syria reinforced Turkish fears of a contiguous Kurdish security architecture along its southern border.

That strategic equation is now collapsing.

The PKK's decision to end its armed struggle has changed the political environment inside Turkey. The SDF's integration into the Syrian state has simultaneously reduced the possibility that Syria would preserve an independent Kurdish military structure along Turkey's border. These developments do not eliminate Kurdish political aspirations. They substantially reduce the military structures through which those aspirations previously possessed strategic leverage.

This distinction will define the next phase.

Turkey has spent years attempting to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish military belt stretching from Iraq through Syria toward Iran. The new process offers Ankara something much more valuable than another temporary military victory: the possibility of dismantling that regional architecture through political agreements rather than permanent warfare.

But that opportunity also creates a dilemma for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Erdoğan’s Kurdish Opening Is Also a Political Calculation

The Kurdish peace process cannot be separated from Turkey’s domestic political arithmetic.

The opposition has been weakened by a series of political and legal battles, while Erdoğan continues to face the constitutional question of whether he can seek another presidential term. Turkey’s constitution requires a substantial parliamentary majority to renew presidential and parliamentary elections during the current term. The governing bloc does not possess that threshold alone.

That makes Kurdish political support potentially decisive.

The Kurdish-aligned Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, or DEM Party, controls enough parliamentary seats to become strategically important to any constitutional maneuver requiring a broader majority. This does not mean Kurdish politicians have become natural allies of Erdoğan. It means the collapse of the opposition’s ability to construct an alternative political coalition has altered the political cost-benefit calculation.

This is where Turkey’s Kurdish process becomes particularly complicated.

The government needs Kurdish votes without appearing dependent upon Kurdish concessions. Erdoğan needs political flexibility without provoking the nationalist constituency that remains essential to his governing coalition. Devlet Bahçeli and the Nationalist Movement Party have therefore become crucial to understanding why the process can advance without Erdoğan personally becoming its sole political owner.

That distance is strategically useful.

Erdoğan can support legislation establishing a framework for disarmament and reintegration while allowing institutions of the Turkish state to carry much of the responsibility for implementation. This gives Ankara room to advance the process while preserving the ability to slow or reverse elements of it if nationalist resistance intensifies.

The significance of the legislation was already apparent when I examined it in Turkey’s New “Framework Law” Could Redefine the Kurdish Question—and Strengthen Öcalan’s Political Influence. The central issue was never simply whether the PKK would disarm. It was whether the legal framework would create a political process capable of outliving the organization itself.

That question has now become even more important.

Kurdish votes may help Erdoğan. But Kurdish political concessions remain politically dangerous for a government that must simultaneously manage nationalist expectations.

The result is a process deliberately constructed around ambiguity.

From Öcalan’s Prison Cell to the Regional Diplomatic Table

Perhaps the most remarkable element of the process is the continued political influence of Abdullah Öcalan.

After decades in prison, Öcalan has retained an extraordinary ability to influence the strategic direction of the movement he founded. His February 2025 call for the PKK to abandon armed struggle and pursue a political path provided the ideological foundation for the transformation now taking place.

His influence extends beyond Turkey.

The PKK's historical networks became deeply embedded in Kurdish politics across Syria and Iraq. That meant that a decision concerning the future of the organization could not remain confined to southeastern Turkey. The future of the PKK necessarily became connected to the future of Kurdish armed structures in northern Syria and to the organization's presence in northern Iraq.

This is why the simultaneous movement in Turkey and Syria is so important.

When Mazloum Abdi announced the dissolution of the SDF as an independent force and its integration into the Syrian state, he was not simply responding to a Syrian military reality. He was operating within a wider Kurdish strategic environment in which the space for maintaining independent armed structures had dramatically narrowed.

In The End of the SDF Is Not the End of the Kurdish Question in Syria, I argued that the dissolution should be understood as a strategic gamble rather than simply a defeat. The central question is whether Syrian Kurds can convert a decade of military leverage into lasting constitutional, political, and cultural rights.

That is a much harder task than defeating ISIS.

The SDF's partnership with Washington gave Syrian Kurds military capabilities, international visibility, and political leverage. But the partnership was never a formal guarantee of Kurdish autonomy. Once Washington decided that its principal counterterrorism mission was complete and reduced its military presence, the strategic foundations of the Kurdish autonomous project weakened rapidly.

Abdi therefore faced an increasingly stark choice.

He could attempt to preserve a military structure without reliable American protection, or he could negotiate incorporation into a Syrian state whose institutions he did not fully trust.

He chose the second option.

That decision was not necessarily a surrender.

It was a recognition that the balance of power had changed.

America’s Withdrawal Changed the Kurdish Equation

The United States played a central role in creating the strategic environment that allowed Syrian Kurdish forces to become an important regional actor.

Washington's partnership with Kurdish-led forces during the campaign against ISIS gave the SDF military capabilities, international legitimacy, and political visibility that would have been difficult to obtain otherwise.

But the partnership had a ceiling.

The United States never formally committed itself to defending an independent Kurdish political entity in northeastern Syria. Washington's central objective was the defeat of ISIS. Once that mission became less demanding, the strategic justification for maintaining a large American military presence became weaker.

The consequence was profound.

For years, Kurdish political actors could negotiate with Damascus and Ankara while knowing that American power remained in the background. After the American withdrawal, that leverage diminished.

My analysis When the Common Enemy Disappears, Alliances Change: Mazloum Abdi’s Realist Lesson for the Syrian Kurds examined precisely this problem. The lesson was not that Washington had betrayed the Kurds, but that the Kurdish-American relationship had always been structured around overlapping interests rather than a permanent political guarantee.

This is why the SDF's dissolution should not be interpreted simply as the failure of Kurdish diplomacy. It should be understood as the consequence of a changing balance of power.

Kurdish actors are now confronting a regional environment in which military partnerships are becoming less reliable while institutional politics are becoming more important.

That transition will define the next decade.

Kurdish Strategic Value Is Rising — But Kurdish Leverage May Be Falling

This is perhaps the central paradox of the new regional order.

The strategic importance of the Kurds has increased dramatically over the past decade.

Kurdish actors have fought ISIS, controlled strategically important territory, influenced the security calculations of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and the United States, and become critical participants in regional energy and transportation networks.

Yet the ability of Kurdish actors to independently determine regional outcomes may be declining.

That distinction matters.

In The Kurds as the Connecting Link in Washington’s New Regional Strategy, I argued that Washington's emerging approach to Iraq, Syria, and Turkey increasingly connects energy, trade, infrastructure, security, and regional connectivity. Kurdish actors are becoming a connecting layer between these systems rather than simply military partners.

This could eventually represent a historic transition.

Kurdish political importance may increasingly come from their position inside regional networks rather than from control over independent military territories.

For Kurdish political movements, that means the old tools are becoming less effective.

Guerrilla warfare is increasingly vulnerable to drones, surveillance, intelligence integration, precision weapons, and persistent aerial monitoring. Territorial autonomy without external guarantees is increasingly difficult to defend. Armed organizations can create leverage, but they can also trigger coordinated pressure from multiple states.

Political institutions therefore become more important.

The future Kurdish struggle may be fought through constitutions, elections, local government, economic integration, education, cultural rights, and international diplomacy.

The battlefield is moving toward institutions.

The Kurdistan Region Is Becoming Part of the Peace Architecture

Northern Iraq is perhaps the most underappreciated component of this transformation.

The PKK's presence in the Kurdistan Region has for decades created a strategic triangle involving Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil. Turkish military operations against PKK positions have affected border communities and complicated the Kurdistan Regional Government's relations with Turkey.

At the same time, the KRG has had limited ability to force the PKK to leave territories where the organization maintains longstanding networks.

A successful Turkish-PKK settlement could therefore change the security geography of the Kurdistan Region.

In The PKK After Dissolution: Peace Dividend or Strategic Transformation?, I argued that the end of the PKK's armed struggle could reshape not only Turkey but also the security and political environment of Iraq and Syria. The potential peace dividend includes reduced military pressure, improved border security, stronger trade, and a different relationship between Ankara and the Kurdistan Region.

But northern Iraq also creates a political challenge.

The peace process increasingly requires cooperation between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.

The KDP and PUK have different relationships with Turkey, different political priorities, and different perceptions of the PKK. Yet verification of disarmament and the management of former PKK members cannot be handled by one Kurdish political party alone.

This creates an unusual opportunity for intra-Kurdish coordination.

If Erbil and Sulaymaniyah can coordinate their approach, the Kurdistan Region could become an important institutional bridge between Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Kurdish political actors.

If they remain divided, external powers will have greater freedom to manage the Kurdish question independently.

That is why the Kurdish peace process is not simply a Turkish issue.

It is also an Iraqi Kurdish strategic issue.

Turkey’s Relationship With Iraqi Kurdistan Could Enter a New Era

A genuine reduction in the PKK threat would allow Ankara to rethink its relationship with the Kurdistan Region.

For years, Turkish policy contained an apparent contradiction. Ankara wanted deep economic relations with the KRG while simultaneously conducting military operations against the PKK inside Iraqi Kurdish territory.

That contradiction shaped everything from energy policy to cross-border commerce.

But the strategic relationship has already been changing.

My analysis Türkiye, the Kurdistan Region, and the New Regional Equation examined how Ankara, the Kurdistan Region, Baghdad, and the future security architecture of northern Iraq were becoming increasingly interconnected.

The end of the PKK conflict could accelerate that transformation.

Turkey may increasingly view the Kurdistan Region through several overlapping lenses: border security, energy, trade, investment, infrastructure, and competition with Iran.

That does not mean Ankara will suddenly embrace every Kurdish political demand.

It means the economic value of stability could increasingly outweigh the strategic value of permanent confrontation.

For the Kurdistan Region, this could create a historic opening.

Reduced Turkish military pressure could improve border security and create space for investment, tourism, agriculture, logistics, and energy development.

But there is also a warning.

Turkey and Baghdad are simultaneously developing alternative economic corridors that could reduce the Kurdistan Region's traditional leverage over northern Iraq.

Baghdad, Ankara, and the Corridor Question

The emerging Turkey-Iraq partnership is one of the most important factors shaping the post-PKK regional order.

In Turkey and Iraq’s Emerging Partnership: How the Regional Order Is Being Rewritten, I argued that Ankara and Baghdad are moving from a relationship defined primarily by sovereignty disputes and security tensions toward one increasingly structured around trade, energy, water, infrastructure, and regional connectivity.

That transformation has direct consequences for Kurdistan.

The Development Road is at the center of this emerging partnership. Baghdad wants to transform Iraq into a bridge between the Gulf, Turkey, and European markets. Turkey wants to reinforce its position as the northern gateway to Europe.

The Kurdistan Region sits directly inside this strategic geography.

That creates opportunity—but also competition.

My analysis Iraq’s $17 Billion Development Road Could Rise or Fall on Kurdistan examined why Kurdistan's geography, its relationship with Turkey, and the security environment in northern Iraq could determine whether the project becomes a successful regional corridor.

But Baghdad and Ankara are also exploring alternative routes.

In Turkey’s New Iraq Trade Corridor Could Break Iraqi Kurdistan’s Economic Leverage, I examined how emerging routes through Syria could reduce the Kurdistan Region's traditional role as Iraq's northern gateway.

This is the strategic paradox facing Erbil.

The end of the PKK conflict could improve Kurdistan's security environment while simultaneously weakening one of the geopolitical conditions that made its territory indispensable to Turkey-Iraq trade.

Kurdistan cannot assume that geography alone will protect its economic influence.

It must actively integrate itself into the emerging regional connectivity architecture.

The Kurdistan Region Cannot Afford to Be Bypassed

This is where the wider Kurdish strategic question becomes inseparable from economic policy.

The Kurdistan Region's geographic position has historically been its greatest strategic asset. It sits between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria and provides a natural gateway between Iraq and the Turkish market.

But strategic assets become liabilities when they can be bypassed.

If Turkey and Baghdad develop alternative corridors through federal Iraq and Syria, the Kurdistan Region could gradually lose part of the leverage created by its geography.

The answer should not be confrontation.

It should be integration.

Kurdistan should seek to become part of the Development Road rather than position itself outside it. It should strengthen connections between Duhok, Erbil, Kirkuk, border crossings, industrial zones, tourism centers, and regional markets.

The Region should aim to become a node in the emerging regional system.

A bottleneck can be bypassed.

A node becomes indispensable.

This broader strategic logic is central to my recent analysis Kurdistan in the New Middle Eastern Geopolitics, which argues that Kurdistan's future will depend increasingly on whether it can convert geography, energy, institutions, security capabilities, and regional connectivity into durable strategic influence.

That is the challenge facing Erbil now.

The question is no longer simply how Kurdistan protects what it has.

It is how Kurdistan makes itself necessary to what comes next.

The Greatest Danger: Disarmament Without Political Settlement

The Turkish process now faces its most important test.

Disarmament can be verified.

Political trust cannot.

A government can determine whether weapons have been surrendered. It cannot easily determine whether the political grievances that produced an insurgency have disappeared.

That is why the Turkish framework remains vulnerable.

If former PKK members are reintegrated but Kurdish political demands remain marginalized, the state may achieve temporary stability without resolving the underlying conflict. If constitutional reform fails to address questions of political representation, cultural rights, local governance, and equality, disarmament could eventually be interpreted by parts of the Kurdish movement as unilateral surrender rather than mutual reconciliation.

This is the central warning of the process.

The PKK's dissolution can end an organization.

It cannot by itself resolve a political question.

The same danger exists in Syria.

If Damascus absorbs Kurdish institutions but fails to establish constitutional protections, the Syrian government may gain control of territory without gaining Kurdish political legitimacy.

That would create a frozen conflict rather than a genuine settlement.

The battlefield would have disappeared, but the political conflict would survive underground.

What Washington Should Do Now

The United States has less direct leverage than it once did, but it is not irrelevant.

Washington cannot dictate Turkey's domestic constitutional process. Nor should it attempt to design Syria's political future from outside.

But it can insist on institutional benchmarks.

In Syria, those benchmarks should include equal citizenship, protection of Kurdish-language education, political participation, elected local administration, minority protections, and transparent mechanisms for monitoring implementation.

The objective should not be to recreate the autonomous Kurdish system that existed during the war.

The objective should be to ensure that Kurdish rights survive after that system disappears.

Turkey is more difficult.

Visible American involvement in the Turkish process could strengthen nationalist arguments that Kurdish politics are being directed from Washington. The United States should therefore support the process quietly, encourage judicial and parliamentary safeguards, and press for transparent implementation without attempting to become its political sponsor.

Europe also has a role.

European governments have long possessed economic and political relationships with Turkey, while European institutions have maintained interest in Kurdish rights and democratic standards. That leverage is most useful when applied to institutions rather than personalities.

The objective should be to make peace durable rather than simply celebrate disarmament.

The Fruit of Patience Is Not Yet Sweet

A Turkish proverb says that patience can transform the sour grape into sweet halva.

The current Kurdish process is the product of extraordinary patience, but also extraordinary pressure.

Turkey has learned that military power alone cannot permanently eliminate the Kurdish question. Kurdish movements have learned that military leverage without political guarantees cannot survive indefinitely. Syria has learned that centralized state authority cannot simply erase Kurdish political identity. Washington has learned that partnerships built around military necessity may disappear when American strategic priorities change.

These lessons are now converging.

The result is a historic opportunity.

But it is not yet peace.

The PKK may disappear as an armed organization. The SDF may disappear as an independent military force. Turkey may gain a safer border. Syria may regain greater territorial authority. Iraq and the Kurdistan Region may benefit from reduced conflict.

Yet none of these developments automatically resolves the political questions that generated decades of Kurdish conflict.

The real test will come when today's strategic incentives change.

If Erdoğan no longer needs Kurdish votes, will Ankara continue political reform?

If Damascus becomes stronger, will it preserve Kurdish rights?

If Washington's attention moves elsewhere, will Syria still honor its commitments?

If Öcalan's influence eventually disappears, will Kurdish politics possess institutions capable of sustaining the process?

And if the PKK dissolves, will its political legacy find a legitimate place inside Turkey, Syria, and Iraq?

Those questions will determine whether the current moment becomes a historic peace or merely another pause between conflicts.

For the Kurdistan Region, the strategic priority should be clear. Erbil and Sulaymaniyah should support a genuine reduction in armed conflict while demanding that the emerging regional order recognize Kurdish political and economic interests. The Region should use the opening to strengthen institutions, improve internal coordination, expand economic connectivity, and reduce its exposure to becoming a battlefield for conflicts between neighboring powers.

The Kurdish question is not disappearing. It is changing form.

For nearly half a century, Kurdish politics in the Middle East were shaped by armed struggle, territorial control, insurgency, and competition between states and non-state actors. The emerging order could replace that model with one defined by constitutional politics, economic networks, cross-border diplomacy, and institutional bargaining.

That transition will not be easy. But it may be the first realistic opportunity in decades to move from a Kurdish question defined by war toward one defined by politics. The guns may finally be falling silent. The harder battle is only beginning.

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is the founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis and a geopolitical analyst specializing in Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Syria, regional security, energy geopolitics, and the changing strategic order of the Middle East.

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