By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Sulaimani, Iraq | 13 May 2026— Kurdish Policy Analysis

Iraq’s New Government Is Born in Crisis: Can Ali al-Zaidi Survive Iraq’s Internal Power War?Baghdad finally approved a new government after months of political paralysis, but the rejection of key ministers, Kurdish tensions, militia pressure, and a collapsing oil environment reveal how fragile Iraq’s new order already is.

Six months after Iraq’s elections plunged the country into political deadlock, Baghdad finally has a new government. But instead of signaling stability, the rise of Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi may mark the beginning of a far more dangerous struggle over Iraq’s future.

Iraq’s parliament approved part of Zaidi’s cabinet in a dramatic parliamentary session marked by disputes, rejected nominees, and unresolved power-sharing tensions. Fourteen ministers received parliamentary confidence, while several critical ministries—including Interior and Defense—remain unresolved.

At the center of the new government is the appointment of Bassim Mohammed Khudair al-Abadi as Iraq’s new oil minister, replacing one of the most strategically important positions in the Iraqi state. Iraq’s oil sector remains the foundation of the country’s economy at a moment when regional war, collapsing exports, and the Strait of Hormuz crisis are threatening Baghdad’s financial survival.

A Government Approved — But Not Fully Formed

According to Iraqi parliamentary records, lawmakers approved ministers overseeing oil, finance, foreign affairs, health, agriculture, trade, justice, electricity, communications, and transportation. However, several nominees failed to receive confidence votes, including candidates for Interior, Planning, Reconstruction, and Higher Education.

That matters because Iraq’s most sensitive ministries are not merely administrative posts—they are power centers tied to armed factions, sectarian influence, intelligence networks, and foreign alliances.

The inability to finalize the Interior and Defense ministries immediately exposes the real problem facing Zaidi: Iraq’s elite factions still do not trust one another enough to fully share power.

The parliamentary session itself reportedly descended into heated exchanges as blocs fought over nominations and quotas.

For many Iraqis, the government already looks less like a reform cabinet and more like a temporary truce between competing factions.

The Rise of Ali al-Zaidi

Unlike many previous Iraqi prime ministers, Ali al-Zaidi is not a traditional political heavyweight. He emerged as a compromise candidate after weeks of internal deadlock inside the Shiite Coordination Framework.

Zaidi is primarily known as a businessman and banker with extensive commercial interests across Iraq. His sudden rise reflects how exhausted Iraq’s political elite had become after months of infighting over who would lead the country.

But Zaidi’s appointment also reveals a deeper geopolitical reality: both Washington and Tehran appear willing—for now—to tolerate him.

Reuters reported that US President Donald Trump publicly supported Zaidi during government formation talks, while Iranian officials simultaneously welcomed the formation of the new government.

That rare overlap between American and Iranian approval may appear positive. In reality, it demonstrates how Iraq remains trapped between two competing powers that both want influence over Baghdad without allowing the other side to dominate completely.

Zaidi’s real challenge is not forming a cabinet. It is surviving the impossible balancing act between Tehran, Washington, Iraqi militias, Kurdish factions, Sunni blocs, and a collapsing regional security environment.

Why the Oil Ministry Matters More Than Ever

The confirmation of Bassim Mohammed Khudair al-Abadi as oil minister may ultimately become the most important decision of the entire cabinet vote.

Oil is not just Iraq’s main revenue source—it is the mechanism that keeps the Iraqi political system alive.

But Iraq enters 2026 facing one of the worst oil disruptions in years. The regional conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has disrupted Gulf shipping routes and severely affected Iraqi exports through the Strait of Hormuz. British parliamentary analysis warned that Iraq’s oil revenues in April 2026 were reportedly down roughly 75 percent compared to the previous year.

That economic pressure changes everything.

The Iraqi state depends on oil revenues to pay salaries, maintain subsidies, fund militias, finance patronage networks, and preserve political stability. If exports remain disrupted, Iraq could face a fiscal shock severe enough to destabilize the entire post-2003 political system.

Khudair therefore inherits not merely an energy portfolio, but one of the most dangerous positions in the Iraqi government.

Kurdish Tensions Are Quietly Returning

The new Iraqi government also arrives amid unresolved Kurdish disputes that could soon re-emerge as a major national crisis.

The Kurdish political landscape remains divided over Baghdad relations, oil exports, revenue sharing, and the legitimacy of Iraq’s recent presidential arrangements. The election of Iraqi President Nizar Amedi was already rejected by some Kurdish factions, exposing deep fractures inside Kurdish politics itself.

At the same time, disputes over the Kurdistan Region’s oil exports remain unresolved despite years of negotiations between Erbil and Baghdad.

If Iraq’s financial crisis worsens, pressure on Kurdish budget transfers could rapidly escalate tensions again between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government.

That risk becomes even more dangerous if rival Kurdish parties align with competing regional actors, including Turkey, Iran, or Gulf states.

Militias, Washington, and Tehran

The biggest threat to Zaidi’s survival may ultimately come from Iraq’s armed factions.

Western and regional observers increasingly view Iraq as one of the central battlegrounds in the broader US-Iran confrontation. Reuters and AP both reported that disarming Iran-backed militias remains one of the new government’s most difficult challenges.

But Iraq’s militias are no longer simply military groups. They are deeply embedded in Iraq’s economy, politics, ministries, border crossings, and security institutions.

Any serious attempt to weaken them could trigger political rebellion—or worse.

At the same time, Washington continues pressuring Baghdad to limit Iranian influence inside the Iraqi state.

Zaidi therefore faces contradictory demands:

• The US wants Iraq to curb militia influence.
• Iran wants Iraq to preserve allied armed groups.
• Iraqi factions want ministries and patronage.
• The public wants services and stability.
• The economy may soon lack the money to sustain any of it.

That combination is politically explosive.

Iraq’s Government May Already Be Fragile

Officially, Iraq now has a government.

Unofficially, Iraq still appears trapped in the same unresolved crisis that delayed government formation for months.

The failure to approve major ministries, the growing regional war environment, collapsing oil revenues, Kurdish divisions, militia tensions, and competing foreign pressures all point toward one conclusion:

Ali al-Zaidi may have won parliament’s confidence, but Iraq’s system itself remains deeply unstable.

The new government was born not from political consensus, but from political exhaustion.

And in Iraq, governments built on exhaustion rarely survive long.

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