Iraq’s New Government Is Born Into Chaos: Ali al-Zaidi, Kurdish Power Struggles, and the War Between Washington and Tehran

By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Sulaimani, Iraq | 15 May 2026— Kurdish Policy Analysis

A partial cabinet, rejected ministers, Kurdish bargaining, militia tensions, and American pressure have turned Iraq’s new government into the epicenter of a regional geopolitical storm. For six months, Iraq existed in political paralysis.

Behind the closed doors of Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone, alliances collapsed, rival Shiite factions fought over ministries, Kurdish parties negotiated for influence, Sunni blocs demanded guarantees, and foreign powers quietly intervened to shape the future of the Iraqi state.

Then, suddenly, Iraq’s parliament produced a government.

Or at least part of one.

On one of the most chaotic parliamentary days since the fall of Saddam Hussein, lawmakers granted confidence to businessman-turned-prime minister Ali al-Zaidi and approved 14 ministers while rejecting several key nominees and postponing the most explosive portfolios altogether.

The result was neither victory nor stability. It was a compromise born from exhaustion.And it may already be unraveling.

A Prime Minister Nobody Expected

Only months ago, most Iraqis had never heard of Ali al-Zaidi.

He was not a charismatic populist.
Not a militia commander.
Not a tribal strongman.
Not even a famous parliamentarian.

Instead, Zaidi emerged from Iraq’s business and financial world as a “technocratic compromise” candidate after the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework failed to agree on more powerful and controversial names.

Washington reportedly rejected the possibility of figures closely associated with Iran dominating the premiership. At the same time, internal rivalries between former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, caretaker premier Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, and militia-linked factions threatened to fracture the Shiite political house itself.

Zaidi was the escape hatch.

A neutral face.
A businessman.
A manager.
A man acceptable enough to everyone because he belonged completely to nobody.

But when he entered parliament to present his cabinet, he appeared less like a triumphant leader and more like a man suddenly trapped inside Iraq’s impossible political machine. The symbolism was striking: Iraq’s newest prime minister was sworn in before he even had a complete government.

Parliament Approves a Government — Barely

The parliamentary session rapidly descended into confrontation.

Lawmakers argued over ministries.
Blocs accused one another of betrayal.
Negotiations continued inside the chamber itself.
Several nominees failed to secure sufficient votes.
And the most sensitive ministries — Interior and Defence — were postponed entirely.

In the end, Zaidi secured exactly what he needed:
half-plus-one.

Just enough ministers passed to constitutionally establish a government.

Nothing more.

The scene perfectly reflected Iraq’s post-2003 political system: fragmented, transactional, and permanently unfinished.

The ministries approved included:

• Fuad Hussein remaining as foreign minister for the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
• Khalid Shwani retaining the justice ministry for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
• Sarwa Abdulwahid becoming environment minister as the only woman in the cabinet.
• Ministers tied to Shiite Coordination Framework factions dominating oil, transport, agriculture, health, finance, and infrastructure portfolios.

But several nominees failed outright.

Most notably, the Iraqi parliament rejected KDP nominee Rebaz Hamlan, a close aide to Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani. The rejection shocked Kurdish political circles. Because in Iraq’s political tradition, major parties usually secure their negotiated ministries through backroom agreements before voting even begins. This time, parliament publicly humiliated one of the KDP’s key figures.

The Kurdish Front Is Fracturing

The cabinet vote exposed growing tensions not only in Baghdad but inside Kurdish politics itself. The KDP managed to retain the prestigious foreign ministry through Fuad Hussein, one of the most internationally connected Kurdish politicians in Iraq.

But the rejection of Rebaz Hamlan signaled something deeper: the weakening of automatic Kurdish consensus in Baghdad. Meanwhile, the PUK successfully preserved its hold on the justice ministry and maneuvered politically by backing Sarwa Abdulwahid — a figure associated with the opposition New Generation Movement — for environment minister.

The move was strategic.

By supporting Abdulwahid, the PUK attempted to portray itself as more inclusive while simultaneously expanding its influence beyond traditional party structures. The KDP may now respond with a similar tactic.

Reports suggest the party is considering giving the deputy prime minister position not to a loyal KDP insider but potentially to a Kurdish opposition figure from either the Kurdistan Islamic Union or Halwest. If true, the move would represent an attempt to reshape the balance of power ahead of Kurdistan Region government formation talks.

But opposition parties remain skeptical.

Halwest, Komal, and the Kurdistan Islamic Union collectively boycotted the parliamentary session, refusing to vote for Zaidi. Officially, they claimed the government program ignored Kurdish issues. Unofficially, the dispute appears to revolve around something more familiar in Iraqi politics: power-sharing and ministries.

The Moment Nobody Missed: Nechirvan Barzani and the Silent Snub

Politics in Iraq is often communicated not through speeches but through gestures.

One moment during the parliamentary session immediately captured attention across Kurdish and Iraqi media.

Nechirvan Barzani attended the confidence vote session but notably did not greet Iraqi President Nizar al-Amadi.

In Middle Eastern politics, these moments matter. A missed handshake can sometimes say more than an official statement. Observers also noticed side conversations between Nechirvan Barzani and Bafel Talabani, suggesting Kurdish coordination was continuing behind the scenes even as tensions simmered publicly.

The optics reinforced a broader reality: the Kurdish political house is no longer unified when dealing with Baghdad.

Washington’s Shadow Over Baghdad

No Iraqi government today can emerge without navigating the rivalry between Washington and Tehran. And Zaidi’s government may be the clearest example yet.

Shortly after parliament approved the cabinet, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq issued an unusually warm statement congratulating Zaidi and emphasizing cooperation with the United States on security, economic development, and counterterrorism.

More importantly, the statement explicitly referenced support from Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. That message was not only diplomatic. It was geopolitical signaling.

Washington wanted everyone — Tehran included — to understand that Zaidi’s government had American backing. At the same time, American analysts were already warning that several proposed ministers could trigger sanctions investigations due to alleged links with Iran-aligned networks.

One American Iraq expert, Michael Knights, bluntly described the cabinet list as “throwing down a gauntlet.” The implication was clear: the Trump administration is prepared to escalate pressure on factions it views as tied to Iran.

Iran’s Militias Are the Real Story

The biggest surprise of the cabinet formation was not who entered government.

It was who did not.

Despite the physical presence of Qais al-Khazali during the session, none of the approved ministers were publicly identified as direct representatives of Iran-backed armed factions. That absence appears deliberate.

For months, Washington has reportedly pressured Iraqi political actors to reduce the formal role of militias inside state institutions. The United States accuses Iran-backed groups of carrying out hundreds of attacks against American interests and regional allies during the broader regional confrontation surrounding Iran.

This issue now defines Iraq’s future.

Not corruption.
Not services.
Not elections.

The militias.

Whether they disarm, integrate, or resist will determine the survival of Zaidi’s government. Some factions reportedly seek a face-saving compromise under the religious authority of Ali al-Sistani, hoping that any de-escalation can be framed as a national decision rather than surrender to American pressure.

But Tehran is pushing the opposite direction. Reports indicate Esmail Qaani recently visited Baghdad to urge Iraqi factions not to concede too much to Washington. This leaves Iraq trapped between two competing capitals: Washington demanding state control. Tehran demanding resistance continuity. Zaidi stands in the middle.

Iraq’s Economic Time Bomb

While politics dominates headlines, Iraq’s real crisis may be economic.The closure and instability surrounding the Strait of Hormuz devastated Iraq’s oil exports. At one point, exports reportedly fell from 3.5 million barrels per day to only around 300,000.

For a country whose state budget overwhelmingly depends on oil revenue, the consequences are catastrophic.

Salaries.
Infrastructure.
Public services.
Military spending.

Everything depends on oil. Zaidi’s government inherits an economy balancing on the edge of financial crisis. The reopening of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline through Turkey provided limited relief, but it cannot fully compensate for losses tied to Hormuz instability.

This explains why Iraq’s political crisis is inseparable from regional geopolitics. Baghdad’s survival increasingly depends on:

• American financial flexibility.
• Gulf stability.
• Iranian calculations.
• Turkish energy routes.
• Global oil markets.

Iraq is no longer merely a domestic political arena. It is a pressure point in a much larger geopolitical war.

The Muhasasa System Still Rules Iraq

Despite all promises of reform, Iraq’s cabinet once again reflected the country’s sectarian quota system, known as muhasasa.

Shiite blocs secured the majority of ministries.
Sunni parties received their traditional allocations.
Kurds retained sovereign portfolios.
Opposition forces fought for symbolic inclusion.

The system survives because every major faction fears losing access to the state.

And in Iraq, the state is everything.

Budgets.
Contracts.
Jobs.
Security.
Influence.

Even Zaidi, presented as a “technocrat,” ultimately emerged from this same quota structure. The irony is unavoidable: Iraqis demanded reform after years of paralysis. Instead, they received a faster version of the same political formula.

A Government Born Weak

The deeper problem for Ali al-Zaidi is not simply incomplete ministries.

It is legitimacy.

He was not elected directly.
He lacks an independent political movement.
He depends entirely on fragile coalition agreements.
And he inherits a state under simultaneous pressure from:

• Iran,
• the United States,
• armed factions,
• collapsing finances,
• Kurdish disputes,
• and public distrust.

Even before fully forming his cabinet, his government already looks vulnerable. The rejection of ministers inside parliament revealed that major blocs are still fighting openly. The postponed ministries of Defence and Interior remain ticking time bombs because they control Iraq’s coercive power.

Whoever controls Interior controls intelligence, police structures, and internal security.
Whoever controls Defence shapes Iraq’s military future. The fact these ministries remain unresolved means Iraq’s ruling elite still does not trust itself.

The Real Meaning of Today

The parliamentary vote ended one crisis. But it may have opened another.

Ali al-Zaidi now governs a partial cabinet in a fragmented state during one of the most dangerous geopolitical moments Iraq has faced since the war against ISIS.

His success or failure may depend less on Baghdad than on negotiations taking place in Washington, Tehran, Ankara, Erbil, and the Gulf. For now, Iraq technically has a government. But beneath the ceremony, applause, and constitutional formalities lies a far darker reality: the Iraqi state remains suspended between competing empires, competing militias, and competing visions of its future.

And the man chosen to navigate that storm is a technocrat few Iraqis knew only weeks ago. Whether Ali al-Zaidi becomes Iraq’s stabilizer, caretaker, or next casualty of Iraq’s political machine will define the next chapter of the Middle East itself.

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