Kurdish Policy Analysis

The KRG’s termination of a long-dormant lobbying agreement reflects shifting U.S. priorities, evolving Kurdish strategy in Washington, and the changing geopolitics of Iraq after the anti-ISIS era.

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj  | Sulaimani, Iraq | 06 May 2026 --The Kurdistan Regional Government has formally terminated a lobbying registration with ArentFox Schiff LLP, quietly ending a Washington relationship that appears to have been inactive for years.

The filing, submitted under the U.S. Lobbying Disclosure Act on April 29, 2026, officially closes out the KRG’s registration with the law and lobbying firm. Yet the most revealing detail may not be the termination itself, but the fact that every filing connected to the account since 2021 reported zero compensation.

The administrative closure signals less a sudden political rupture than the formal recognition of a relationship that had effectively ended long ago.

Still, the move comes at a sensitive geopolitical moment for the Kurdistan Region, as U.S. military strategy in Iraq evolves, regional tensions intensify, and Kurdish officials seek to preserve their strategic relevance in Washington amid a changing American foreign policy landscape.

Why It Matters

The Government of Kurdistan, Iraq has filed an LDA termination with ArentFox Schiff LLP, formally closing out a lobbying registration that had been inactive for years. The Lobbying Disclosure Act termination, filed April 29, 2026, shows $0 in compensation across all filings dating back to 2021, suggesting the relationship had wound down well before the paperwork caught up.

A Minimal Loss for a Diversified Firm

For ArentFox Schiff, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was never a revenue driver. The firm's 68 active first quarter 2026 filings total $1,530,000 in reported compensation, led by Rolls-Royce North America Inc. at $510,000. The Kurdistan account reported $0 in compensation across every filing in the database. ArentFox Schiff's client base spans defense, healthcare, education, transportation, and technology, with no single sector dominating. The Kurdistan filing was among a handful of foreign government relationships the firm has been closing out, including a separate termination for the Government of the Ivory Coast.

The KRG Already Has Other Representation

The Kurdistan Regional Government did not leave Washington without a lobbying presence. BGR Government Affairs LLC has been active on the account since at least first quarter 2025, billing $60,000 per quarter on bilateral U.S.-Kurdistan Regional Government relations. That puts BGR's total compensation at $300,000 across five consecutive quarters through first quarter 2026.

The Kurdistan Regional Government's core Washington priorities have long centered on U.S. military support for the Peshmerga, counter-ISIS funding, and managing its complicated relationship with the Iraqi federal government in Baghdad. Those issues are not resolved.

Congress has authorized counter-ISIS funds for Iraq through 2025 and appropriated related funds available through September 2026, including direct aid to the KRG's Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, though subject to Baghdad's approval. The Pentagon's fiscal year 2026 Counter-Terrorism Execution Fund proposes approximately $212.5 million for Iraqi units, including Kurdish Security Forces, meaning the annual appropriations fight over Peshmerga funding remains active.

On the troop presence question, a 2024 U.S.-Iraq agreement set September 2025 as the formal end of the coalition's mission in Iraq, although U.S. forces were reported to remain in the Kurdistan Region itself into 2026, focused on training and counter-terrorism operations.

A Tougher Political Climate

The Trump administration's posture toward sustained military engagement in the Middle East has created a more difficult environment for the KRG's core asks. The drawdown from Iraq, combined with a broader transactional approach to foreign policy, puts pressure on the KRG's ability to secure the kind of long-term security commitments it has historically sought from Washington.

Congressional hearings over the past year have touched on Iraq primarily through the lens of Iranian influence and regional stability. In a May 2025 hearing on State Department counterterrorism effectiveness, Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC-2) raised concerns about Iranian-backed groups wielding influence over branches of the Iraqi government. A March 2026 hearing on U.S. defense strategy featured Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby explicitly stating that current U.S. engagement in the region is "not Iraq 3.0," distancing the administration from nation-building commitments.

Neither hearing focused specifically on the Kurdistan Region, but both reflect the broader congressional conversation the KRG has to navigate.

The ArentFox Schiff Filing History

The Kurdistan Iraq lobbying disclosure record at ArentFox Schiff tells a story of a relationship that had already run its course. Of the 49 filings in the database spanning 2021 through 2026, every single one reports $0 in compensation. The pattern of year-end termination amendments and mid-year termination filings suggests the active engagement ended years before this final foreign agent registration termination was filed. Lobbying compliance requirements mean these administrative close-outs can trail actual activity by months or years.

ArentFox Schiff attorney Daniel Sjostedt had been identified on the firm's website as the point of contact for KRG government relations work, but no specific issues, legislation, or lobbyists were listed in any of the Kurdistan filings.

The Bottom Line

What BGR Brings to KRG's Advocacy

BGR Government Affairs is handling the KRG's current Washington advocacy efforts, and the team it has assembled for the account has relevant foreign policy and defense credentials.

Les Munson III brings experience from the Hill that spans the House Appropriations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the three panels most directly relevant to the KRG's funding and security priorities. He previously worked for Sen. Mark Kirk, a Republican with a strong national security background. That committee footprint matters when the annual Peshmerga funding fight runs through the appropriations and foreign affairs panels.

John Walker Roberts brings multiple terms of experience on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, directly relevant to bilateral U.S.-Kurdistan relations.

Mark Tavlarides previously worked for Rep. Silvestre Reyes, who chaired the House Intelligence Committee, adding another layer of national security experience to the team.

Pete Landrum, who worked for Sen. Jeff Sessions, rounds out a roster that leans heavily on Republican and national security-oriented congressional backgrounds, which may be better suited to the current political environment than what came before.

The team has maintained continuity across all five quarters of BGR's engagement, with the same six lobbyists, including Ed Rogers Jr. and Maya Seiden, working the account throughout. For a foreign government client navigating a complicated set of relationships with both the executive and legislative branches, that kind of consistency is valuable.

Why Washington Still Matters to Erbil

The Kurdistan Region’s priorities in Washington remain fundamentally tied to security, military cooperation, and political leverage within Iraq.

For years, Kurdish officials have focused on three interconnected goals:

• Securing continued U.S. military assistance for the Peshmerga
• Preserving counter-ISIS funding mechanisms
• Managing tensions with Baghdad over federal authority, budgets, and security structures

Those concerns remain unresolved despite the territorial defeat of ISIS.

Although the United States and Iraq agreed in 2024 to formally conclude the coalition mission by September 2025, American forces reportedly remained active in the Kurdistan Region into 2026, primarily focused on training and counterterrorism operations.

At the same time, U.S. defense planning continues allocating substantial resources toward Iraqi and Kurdish security structures. Proposed Pentagon funding under the fiscal year 2026 Counter-Terrorism Execution Fund reportedly includes approximately $212.5 million connected to Iraqi and Kurdish security units.

That means the annual congressional struggle over Peshmerga funding remains politically significant.

For the KRG, lobbying Washington is therefore not merely diplomatic image management — it is directly tied to military capabilities, regional autonomy, and long-term strategic survival.

A More Difficult Environment for Kurdish Advocacy

Yet the political environment confronting Kurdish officials in Washington has become increasingly complicated.

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has reinforced a more transactional and restrained approach toward long-term military engagement in the Middle East.

The administration’s emphasis on strategic retrenchment and burden-sharing creates uncertainty for Kurdish leaders who historically relied on sustained American security commitments.

Recent congressional hearings reveal the broader direction of debate in Washington.

Discussions surrounding Iraq increasingly focus on:

• Iranian influence inside Iraqi political institutions
• Regional instability
• Counterterrorism efficiency
• Reducing long-term American military entanglements

Notably absent from many of these conversations is sustained focus on the Kurdistan Region itself.

That shift matters.

For years after the rise of ISIS, the Kurdish Peshmerga occupied a highly visible role within American political discourse as frontline allies against extremism. As Washington’s priorities shift toward great-power competition, energy security, and domestic politics, Kurdish officials face the challenge of maintaining strategic visibility in an increasingly crowded geopolitical environment.

The Quiet End of a Dormant Relationship

The ArentFox Schiff filings ultimately reveal less about dramatic geopolitical change than about bureaucratic lag.

The database shows 49 filings connected to the KRG between 2021 and 2026, all reporting zero compensation. The repeated amendments and delayed termination notices strongly suggest that meaningful lobbying activity under the arrangement had ceased years earlier.

Such administrative delays are common within lobbying compliance systems, where registrations often remain technically active long after substantive work has ended.

Still, symbolism matters in Washington.

The formal closure underscores how Kurdish advocacy efforts are adapting to a transformed regional environment shaped by:

• post-ISIS recalibration,
• U.S. strategic fatigue,
• regional competition with Iran,
• and uncertainty surrounding Iraq’s future political balance.

What Comes Next for the KRG in Washington?

The KRG’s relationship with the United States remains strategically important, but it is entering a more uncertain phase.

Unlike the emergency years of the anti-ISIS campaign, Kurdish leaders must now compete for attention in a Washington environment increasingly dominated by China, Ukraine, Gulf security, and domestic political polarization.

This means future Kurdish lobbying efforts will likely focus less on emotional wartime alliances and more on pragmatic strategic arguments:

• regional stability,
• energy cooperation,
• intelligence partnerships,
• and counterterrorism reliability.

Whether that strategy succeeds may depend not only on Kurdish diplomacy, but on whether Washington still sees the Kurdistan Region as central to its Middle East calculations.

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