Vance: US-Iran deconfliction cell has IRGC, CENTCOM reps ‘hanging out’ in Doha

Image
  By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis   Vice president reveals extent of coordination established with Revolutionary Guards, a US-designated terror group; Gulf ministers tell Rubio that Iran’s missiles, proxy support must be addressed in final deal US Vice President JD Vance has revealed that the deconfliction channel Washington and Tehran agreed to set up during talks in Switzerland this past weekend includes representatives from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the US Army’s Central Command, who will sit together in Qatar. “One of the things we wanted to come out with [was a] channel on the Iranian side [for reducing conflict], which we did,” Vance said in an interview with the UnHerd British news site, which took place while the vice president flew back from those talks in Switzerland on Monday, but was only published on Thursday. “They were like, ‘OK, fine, we’ll send somebody from the IRGC to go hang out in Doha with somebody from CENTCOM,’ and th...

The Middle East’s Strategic Reordering from less Islamism to more Nationalism


By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis
 

One of the more revealing consequences of the recent war in Iran has been the subtle transformation in how the Islamic Republic presents itself to its own society. State media has increasingly showcased women in patriotic and military imagery—including women who openly support the state without adhering to traditional hijab expectations—signaling a broader shift in official messaging. 

Faced with external pressure and regional confrontation, Iran appears to be constructing a more inclusive national identity rooted less in religious symbolism and more in patriotism and state cohesion. This evolution reflects a wider regional trend: across the Middle East, political Islam is losing its dominance as governments increasingly turn toward nationalism as a new source of legitimacy.

From revolutionary ideology to pragmatic statecraft, the Middle East may be entering the post-political Islam era—where nationalism, security, and economic legitimacy increasingly replace religion as the organizing principle of power.

Has political Islam reached its limits? From Iran and Saudi Arabia to Syria and Tunisia, Middle Eastern states are redefining legitimacy through nationalism, security, and economic modernization rather than religious governance.

The Question That Once Seemed Impossible

For decades, political Islam appeared not merely influential but historically inevitable.

Beginning with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, reinforced by the rise of Islamist parties across the Arab world and accelerated by the collapse of secular Arab nationalism, many observers assumed religion would become the dominant language of Middle Eastern politics.

Islamists promised something powerful. Not simply governance. They promised justice. They promised authenticity. They promised independence from foreign domination. Most importantly, they claimed to offer an alternative to authoritarian secular states that had failed to deliver prosperity, dignity, or strategic autonomy.

Today, however, the conversation has changed. Across the Middle East, political leaders, citizens, and even former Islamist movements appear increasingly reluctant to define politics primarily through religion.

Religion remains deeply important. But political Islam as a governing project appears to be losing momentum. A different organizing principle is emerging: nationalism.

Defining Political Islam: The Ideology That Refused a Single Definition

Political Islam has always resisted precise definition. For some, it means applying Islamic law to public life. For others, it means allowing Islamic values to shape governance. For movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, it became an electoral ideology. For revolutionary groups, it became a framework for remaking society. For states, it became an instrument of legitimacy. The slogan that perhaps captured the movement most famously was simple:

“Islam is the solution.”

That phrase carried enormous power because it framed religion not only as personal faith but as a comprehensive political answer. Economics. Foreign policy. Justice. Identity. State institutions. Everything could be reorganized around religious principles. But governing proved harder than mobilizing.

Iran: Political Islam’s Greatest Success—and Its Most Important Test Case

No state represents political Islam more completely than Iran. Unlike Islamist parties that competed inside secular systems, Iran fundamentally transformed the state itself. Its revolution attempted something historically unique: To create an Islamic republic where religious legitimacy and modern state administration became inseparable.

For decades Iran appeared to prove that political Islam could govern. The system survived sanctions. It survived regional wars. It built extensive influence across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Yet success introduced a new problem. Governance creates expectations. People no longer judge revolutionary slogans.

They judge outcomes. Economic performance. Institutional competence. Personal freedoms. National strength. This shift increasingly exposed tensions inside the Iranian model. The revolutionary generation emphasized Islamic identity. Younger generations increasingly prioritize opportunity, sovereignty, and normalcy.

That does not necessarily mean secularization. Rather, it suggests a separation between personal faith and political legitimacy. Interestingly, recent developments inside Iran reveal this evolution. National symbolism, Persian identity, and patriotic narratives increasingly complement—and sometimes overshadow—the language of Islamic revolution. That is not abandonment. It is adaptation.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Crisis of Electoral Islamism

If Iran represented revolutionary Islamism, the Muslim Brotherhood represented democratic Islamism. The Brotherhood’s strategy was different.

Rather than overthrow states, it sought legitimacy through elections. The movement expanded because it offered a disciplined political identity where secular opposition appeared fragmented. But electoral victories created difficult realities. Once in office, slogans had to become policy.

In Egypt, the Brotherhood struggled to build broad coalitions. In Tunisia, Islamist success eventually collided with public frustration over economic stagnation and institutional paralysis. The issue was not necessarily religious belief. It was performance. Citizens increasingly asked:

Can Islamist governments deliver jobs? Can they provide security? Can they manage economies? Political legitimacy became less ideological and more transactional.

Saudi Arabia: From Religious Legitimacy to Developmental Nationalism

Perhaps nowhere illustrates this transformation more dramatically than Saudi Arabia. For decades, the kingdom grounded authority partly through strict religious conservatism. Social restrictions shaped everyday life. Public space was heavily regulated. Religion formed a central pillar of governance.

Then came strategic recalibration. Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia launched one of the most ambitious national transformation projects in modern Middle Eastern history. Entertainment expanded. Women entered public and economic life more visibly. Tourism developed. Investment and modernization became strategic priorities. Importantly, Saudi Arabia did not abandon Islam. It repositioned it.

Religion remains foundational. But national development increasingly became the language of legitimacy. The state now asks citizens to imagine themselves not primarily as guardians of religious orthodoxy—but as participants in a rising Saudi national project. This distinction matters.

Syria: From Jihadist Origins to Political Pragmatism

Syria presents another revealing case. During the civil war, Islamist language dominated large parts of the opposition landscape. Various factions promised Islamic governance. But governing reality changed incentives. After regime change dynamics altered the political environment, Islamist rhetoric softened. Political survival required diplomacy. International recognition. Economic recovery. State-building. Even leaders with Islamist backgrounds increasingly adopted nationalist and pragmatic language.

This reflects a broader regional lesson: Winning wars and governing states are fundamentally different activities. Movements that once promised ideological purity increasingly prioritize institutional survival.

Why Political Islam Is Losing Momentum

Several forces explain this shift.

1. Governance replaced ideology

Citizens increasingly judge outcomes rather than promises.

2. Terrorism damaged Islamist branding

Groups like ISIS reshaped global and regional perceptions.

Even peaceful Islamist actors faced reputational spillover.

3. Economic pressure changed political priorities

Jobs, inflation, housing, and investment increasingly dominate public concern.

4. Generational change

Young populations remain religious but often reject ideology as a governing formula.

5. Geopolitical competition rewards pragmatism

Foreign investment and strategic partnerships increasingly favor predictable governance.

The Rise of National Identity

If political Islam is declining, what replaces it? National identity. This does not mean European-style nationalism. Middle Eastern nationalism is becoming hybrid. Religion remains culturally central. But states increasingly emphasize:

  • National pride

  • Economic modernization

  • Sovereignty

  • Historical identity

  • Development

  • Strategic autonomy

Saudi identity. Syrian identity. Iranian identity. Even countries with strong Islamic foundations increasingly rely on national narratives. This transition reflects an important realization: States need broader coalitions than ideological movements.

Iran’s New Formula: Security State with Islamic Characteristics?

Iran deserves special attention because its evolution may define the future of political Islam. The system increasingly appears less clerical and more institutional. Security structures play a larger governing role.Religion still legitimizes power. But practical governance increasingly operates through state institutions and strategic interests.

This creates a paradox. Political Islam may not disappear. It may transform. Future Islamist states could become: More nationalist. More militarized. More technocratic. Less theological. Iran may be showing that evolution in real time.

Conclusion: Political Islam Is Not Dying—It Is Being Absorbed

Predictions of political Islam’s disappearance would be premature. Religion remains central to Middle Eastern societies. Faith continues to shape identity, morality, and legitimacy.

But the era when religion alone could organize political imagination appears weaker than before. The Middle East may be entering a post-ideological phase. Not secular. Not post-religious. But post-Islamist.

A region where governments increasingly seek legitimacy not by promising heaven on earth—but by promising stability, growth, and national revival. If the twentieth century belonged to nationalism, and the early twenty-first century belonged to political Islam, the next phase may belong to something more blended:

States that speak the language of faith— but govern through the logic of power.

#PoliticalIslam #MiddleEast #Iran #SaudiArabia #Syria #Geopolitics #Islamism #Nationalism #MENA #ForeignPolicy


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Iran War Freezes Turkey–PKK Peace Process: A Hidden Front Opening Inside the Middle East Collapse

Iranian Media Unveils ‘Lord of the Straits’ Animation Amid Hormuz Tensions

A Managed Divorce May Be Better Than a Violent Marriage, the case of Kurdistan Region of Iraq